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This thesis proposes new methods and tools for helping human traders to compete in a high-
frequency trading environment. Human traders have difficulty trading against predatory 
algorithms and the thesis proposes methods that support the creation of assistive tools that 
can help human traders to compete profitably. It also develops further understanding of 
classical decision-making theory in a realtime trading context demonstrating that human 
traders improve decision-making biases when linked together in groups or with an assistive 
machine. 
  
As described in the thesis human traders are monitored, and their data is captured, in realtime 
and in situ. The trading performance and behavioural characteristics of the traders are studied 
in this context in order to determine if they can be positively modified. The thesis presents a 
new model for studying human trading behaviour in realtime and in situ using unique 
software. It also describes the basis for the development of a range of interventionist and 
assistive tools that are designed to augment trading performance. The approach put forward 
is unique in its application. It also provides evidence that human traders are willing to allow 
machines to augment their trading decisions.  
 
The contributions of this thesis are that it overcomes the problem of assessing human trader 
risk-taking behaviour in realtime and in situ, it makes sense of human trading behaviour at 
realtime speeds and then it shows that, with new approaches to human-machine 
collaboration, trading performance improves and classic decision-making biases are 
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This Chapter introduces the thesis by providing a summary of the main areas of the research 
highlighting the aims and objectives and areas of interest with regard to further study. The results 





In most electronically traded markets speed has become everything [1] [2]. The faster 
markets have become the more difficult they have been to trade especially from a human 
perspective as human traders need to compete, in many cases, with high-frequency traders 
(HFTs). Extreme trading speeds have meant that sophisticated market operators with 
high-speed computational order routing advantages are natural winners when transactions 
on the exchange’s central limit order book (CLOB) are ranked in price-time priority by 
the exchange matching-engine model. Market participants who have the money and the 
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expertise seek to leverage technological advantage, accommodative order types and 
server co-location opportunities provided by exchanges, in order to gain advantage.   
  Researchers have recently highlighted how human traders, or low frequency traders 
(LFTs), are subject to predatory algorithmic trading strategies from high-frequency 
traders (HFTs) designed to monopolise them [3]. One result of this traded market 
automation, extreme transaction speed and the saturation of algorithmic trading is that the 
human traders have been pushed to the higher-latency, lower-frequency multiple-
millisecond fringes of realtime without the tools to compete with such sophisticated 
machine-based competition in the single digit millisecond sphere and are very much at 
the mercy of predatory algorithmic trading techniques. The human trader is, in such 
respects, the fall guy and increasingly shows an unwillingness to participate when the 
odds of success are so firmly stacked against them [3].  
  This expulsion of human traders to the borderlands of realtime transactional activity, 
namely multiple milliseconds rather than single digit microseconds, has several unwanted 
side-effects one of which is, paradoxically, at the centre of the current financial regulatory 
objective [2]; that is, to improve the ethical standing of the marketplace. Given the number 
of high-profile scandals [4] that the financial markets have had to contend with over the 
last few years it is surprising that not more is made of the biased advantage that HFTs 
have in realtime traded markets. Indeed, recent interpretations of HFT’s is that they are 
dysfunctional rather than a benefit to markets [5] [6] [10]. This situation is at odds with 
some of the current Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) literature which values the 
human centric approach [7] to computer application design.  
12 
 
  While realtime markets become more complex, and machine trading becomes 
ubiquitous and all consuming, ‘what is the role of the human trader?’ and ‘is there a space 
left for them to compete successfully’? Kumiega and Van Vliet [8] point out that “Finance 
has evolved from human traders and manual control to automation and computer 
numerical control” and that this is a continuing trend with automated trading accounting 
for 75% of financial markets now [9]. Is this a one-way street or should we be looking at 
a different approach with different goals? A rethink with regard to human involvement in 
trading markets also questions some fundamental aspects of financial services: 
1. Is speed the true goal? 
2. Should markets be entirely driven by machines? 
3. Are they ethically sound? 
4. What is the purpose of trading markets? 
5. Who benefits from them? 
6. Who are these markets designed to serve? 
 
In the current climate the question is ‘If there is space for human traders how can they 
compete with faster, more aggressive predatory machine algorithms?’ There is little doubt 
that the human trader will need help when competing in today’s electronic marketplace 
in order to compete with HFTs. With the growing implementation of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) in high-frequency trading algorithmic development, things look bleaker 
still for the less sophisticated and slower LFTs. Should we expect human traders to take 
very little part in traded markets in the future, or to operate on the fringes of those markets 
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as initial order instigators through asset management institutions who undertake the 
transactional aspect of the business?  
  This thesis takes the view, and seeks to show, that the human trader is far from finished 
with respect to trading participation in financial markets. In the same way that recent 
studies in neuroscience and economical decision making suggest that there is “a need for 
a new set of constructs to underlie economic decision making” [11] so too does the study 
of realtime human trader decision-making in situ.  
  This thesis extends the research in this domain by introducing new models, techniques 
and practical tools that intervene and augment decision-making in order to provide the 
basis for re-evaluating the position of the human trader. The new technology described in 
this thesis sits in its own area between autonomics [12], Directive Decision Devices 
(DDDs) [13], robotics and AI in that the trader has a collaborative relationship with the 
technology while sharing an ambivalent but positive decision-making process. This new 
area of interest could be referred to as ‘behavioural interventionist’: it relies upon 
augmenting realtime trader behaviour through assistive tools that seek to promote good 
trading abilities and to suppress those that have negative impact. The thesis deals with the 
formulation of the design science supporting these new tools. With new insight, concepts, 
models and tools, human traders can utilize useful aspects of some of the technology that 
the HFTs are using and extend the opportunity to create their own technology in an 
enhanced way.  
  The thesis details the behavioural study of a group of 32 LFTs made up of a mixture of 
professional traders and finance PhD students. Together, over a six-week period, they 
generated as a group a total of 150 daily trading sessions (day-trading), an average of 
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nearly five trading sessions per trader. Each trader traded for a minimum of two hours 
during the individual experimental trading sessions. They could choose to trade for longer 
than two hours if they wished. The tick-data that was generated captured their individual 
behavioural characteristics in detail. This enables the realtime, and historical, assessment 
of their data using specifically designed software for this purpose that will be described 
later in the thesis.  
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
 
The main aim of this research is to explore and analyse human trading behaviour in 
realtime markets using detailed, realtime trading data and then to use the findings to 
produce new methods and models for interpreting and enhancing profitable trader 
behaviour in realtime and in situ. The price data generated by the exchange and populated 
in the trading software was realtime tick data. In addition, the aim is to produce new 
models and methods that support the potential link between the human trader and a range 
of newly designed behavioural interventionist trading tools (BITs) that augment trading 
behaviour.   
 
The objectives of the research are: 
1. To study human trading activity in realtime and in situ using newly created data 
capture and analysis software.  
i. The complex nature and speed of realtime trading markets has made 
realtime trading data analysis difficult. In the current research it is vital that 
every aspect of the trader’s digital audit trail is captured, along with the 
price activity of the market, while the trader is trading if an accurate 
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assessment of their behaviour is to take place. A new data analysis tool 
(Realtime Trading Data Sampler (RTDS)) that operates in realtime while 
the trader is trading, was developed in order to overcome the realtime data 
analysis challenges and to provide detailed data analysis of the digital audit 
trail. 
ii. This realtime analysis capability, in turn, enables researchers to link the 
trader data to a number of realtime processes that can interpret, modify and 
potentially intervene in the trader’s trading activity.  
iii. By examining the role of human traders in the financial markets, and how 
their position has changed due to the increase in speed and complexity of 
traded markets, a more detailed understanding of human risk and decision- 
making at realtime speeds can be achieved.  
 
2. To describe the classic and current literature relating to the study of human 
trading behaviour and to highlight new observations in the thesis that extend 
their interpretations. 
i. In particular, the opportunity for researchers to study and interpret realtime 
trading behaviour in situ has, so far, proved difficult and elusive. 
Researchers suggest the increased speed of markets has created problems 
for practitioners and observers in being able to interpret captured data 
especially as it is now in microseconds [2]. As a result of these conditions 
in the markets the opportunity to make meaningful interpretations of trading 
behaviour (high-frequency and low-frequency) and market actions has 
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become problematic at such high speeds.  The thesis examines why this is 
the case and proposes alternative methods for researchers to overcome this 
problem.   
3. To introduce a range of metrics (see Appendix for the full list) designed to 
provide researchers with new ways to interpret the data set of human trader 
activity. 
i. Quantifying trader behaviour in realtime and in situ requires the use of 
metrics to interpret the realtime digital audit trail. 127 metrics were 
designed and implemented into RTDS in order to do this.(See Appendix) 
ii. The metrics have eight categories:  
1. Base metrics 
2. Time interval and Time taken metrics 
3. Use of Time metrics 
4. Trading Sequence metrics 
5. Confidence metrics 
6. Performance Taper and Drift metrics 
7. Pattern Recognition metrics 
8. Restoration and Recovery metrics 
9. Explosive moments metrics 
iii. Each category of metrics is tied to specific trader activity including time in 
trades, time between trades, evidence of efficiency, confidence, reaction to 
fast-moving events, pattern recognition and the ability to recover from loss. 
For example, Time interval and Time taken metrics provide evidence of the 
trader’s time intervals between trades as well as the length of time that the 
trader holds open trades. Use of time metrics show how well a trader made 
use of the time in the trade which is important for evidence of efficiency 
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and can mapped directly to the winner/loser ratio of trading success and 
other measures that show the profitable, or loss making, outcome of the 
trader’s activity. Trading sequence measures relate to the specific market 
condition that the trader is trading in, so it measures the trader’s 
performance against various market conditions be they breakouts, trending 
momentum or sideways moving. Performance taper and drift metrics show 
the trader’s ability to make the best of the trades he is in by observing how 
much profit he leaves on the table when exiting trades as well as quantifying 
how the trader’s profitability may taper off over certain market conditions 
like fast markets or momentum conditions. Pattern recognition metrics look 
for signs of the trader repeating successful behaviour in similar market 
conditions where he has recognised a certain pattern and responds positively 
to it. Restoration and Recovery metrics record how well a trader recovers 
from loss to profit and the momentum with which this happens. The rate at 
which, and the success with which, the trader recovers from adverse loss 
making behaviour is an important observation of skill and efficiency. 
Lastly, Explosive moments metrics capture the trader’s behaviour when 
certain unexpected events occur like event trading breakouts following the 
announcement of economic information, or extreme price movements. 
These metrics record how well the trader made use of these sudden 
unexpected events to improve profitability or to reduce loss. There are more 
metrics under development.  
iv. The metrics used in this thesis are as follows:  
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  Number of Winners 
 Number of Losers 
 Number of Consecutive Winners 
 Number of Consecutive Losers 
 Number of Scratches 
 Average Trade Size 
 Average P&L per Trade 
 Number of Trades 
 Number of Orders 
 Average Time between Trades 
 Average Time in Trade 
 Maximum Positive Drift 
 Maximu Negative Drift 
 Ratio of Winners to Losers 
v. A detailed discussion of the results from the experiments using these metrics 
is provided in Chapter 4.  
vi.  The quantified trader data is then displayed on RTDS for the researcher to 
observe.    
4. To design and implement a number of practical experiments that examine trader 
behaviour in realtime and in situ.  
i. The results of these experiments provide the basis for the design theory 
supporting the interaction between human traders and behavioural 
interventionist machines. 
5. To design new models and methods that form the basis for improving human 
trader activity in realtime markets 
i. The aim is to determine if the trader’s profitability can be influenced by 
positively modifying their trading behaviour using a series of new 
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interventionist techniques that introduce a new level of human-machine 
collaboration in trading. 
6. To show how the results of realtime trading experiments provide the basis for 
creating new models and processes to integrate interventionist trading tools into 
human trading activity designed to augment trading behaviour. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis develops a structured approach to the above aims and objectives. It begins with 
Chapter 2 which provides a comprehensive description of the background to the study of 
human traders and their risk taking behaviour and describes the previous research 
undertaken in this area. It then provides a survey and assessment of traditional behavioural 
finance literature with special emphasis on heuristics and biases applicable to trading. 
Chapter 3 describes the detailed realtime data set and explains the problems in examining 
human realtime trading data in situ. It introduces new methods and processes that can be 
used to overcome these problems and to form a more complete understanding of the 
realtime data set. It introduces newly created software designed for the purpose of 
providing a practical method for realtime data capture and analysis. Chapter 4 identifies 
three classic academic studies with regard to human trading heuristics and biases, namely 
Loss Aversion [14] [15] [16], the Disposition Effect [17] and Overconfidence in 
Predictions [18] [19] and describes how these can be viewed in different ways following 
the opportunity to study trader behaviour in realtime. Chapter 5 describes a new design 
theory and method for potentially linking human traders with realtime interventionist 
tools that augment their decision-making processes and, ultimately, their profitability. 
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This extension of the current research understanding in the area of human trading 
behaviour to machine collaboration is new to financial markets and forms a promising 
new area of research.  
  The conclusion of the thesis shows that detailed realtime data can be studied and linked 
to behavioural clues as well as to the psychological profile of the trader. It shows that a 
combination of realtime data assessment, psychological and personal understanding of 
the trader and the market place and the modifications made to ‘critical point activities’ 
can enhance trading activity leading to a rethink with regard to market microstructure. 
Critical point activities are those immediate actions that traders take when interacting with 
realtime price data that are based on short-term, sometimes subconscious, appreciation of 
risky or critical situations that demand a high level of cognitive expense and which result 
in immediate positive or negative feedback. These activities, which account for trader’s 
profitability or loss under volatile market conditions for example, are similar to those 
deployed by service personnel like firemen or police officers in critically demanding 
situations that endanger life. Lo and Repin [45] refer to these skills in their work on 
emotionally-based decision making and [98] [99] refers to these skills in their work on 




This thesis describes and promotes a new level of understanding with regard to human 
trader behaviour through access to, and interpretation of, rich realtime data sets in the 
field, in situ. The findings significantly broaden the scope to create new study methods 
and models for behavioural analysis at realtime speeds. The outcome of this thesis, then, 
is to show how the results of realtime trading experiments provide the potential for 
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creating interventionist trading tools and new realtime models that augment behaviour. 
By doing so, it brings into play the potential for new ideas aimed at improving financial 
markets design and transactional processes linked to market microstructure, HFT and 
market regulation. In future following the findings detailed in this thesis, there is merit in 
the possible modification to financial market transaction architectures, in particular, the 
industry reliance on realtime transactions and microsecond trading speeds. Indeed, by 
describing a more complete understanding of human trader behaviour in situ and in 
realtime we have the potential to change the way we currently think about realtime market 
design.  
  By initially showing how the results of realtime trading experiments provide the basis 
for creating interventionist trading tools and new realtime models associated with them, 
the thesis then leads forward to reassess, among other things, the role of trading ethics, 




















Chapter 2  
 
Literature Review  
 
This Chapter provides background to the study of trading behaviour and a review of the literature 
forming the foundations of economical risk-taking. risky decision-making and behavioural 





The study of human behaviour in relation to economical risk-taking has a long history. 
The foundation begins in the mid-18th century and moves up to the present day through 
several iterations. This Chapter describes how this progress can be observed in the 
academic literature and how we have arrived at a point where the science is ready to move 
to a new level and towards the recognition that humans will have a close behavioural 
association with supportive machines. According to recent research the decision sciences 
are “undergoing a process of reframing” [20] with the acknowledgement of the 
requirement for a “more unified and complete understanding of decision making”. This 







2.2.1 Human Economical Decision-Making 
 
The first proponent of a link between economics and psychology was the classical 
economist Adam Smith in the 18th Century [21]. In a similar way Jeremy Bentham wrote 
extensively on the psychological support for the theory of Utility [22] which, he believed, 
was based on the rational assumption that individuals would seek to maximize their utility 
as much as possible. If they favored a good or service above others, they would tend to 
buy more of it, thus influencing the supply/demand balance. Over the ensuing two 
hundred and fifty years the psychological determination of economics and economic 
theory went through periods of popularity with strong opposition from the proponents of 
natural sciences in the 1850’s and the developing theories of rationality and homo 
economicus [23]. In the first part of the 20th Century neo-classical economists like John 
Maynard Keynes and Irving Fisher based much of their theory on psychological factors 
influencing economics and market behavior [24] [25].  
2.2.2 The Rationalist Approach 
 
By the mid-20th Century, the rationalists were back with the Expected Utility theory and 
Discounted Utility models began to gain widespread acceptance. Perhaps the most 
important development in post-war economic theory was brought about by Eugene F. 
Fama when he introduced the concept of the random walk in stock prices [26] and the 
Efficient Market Theory or the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) [27], which stated 
that stock market prices fully and promptly reflect all publicly available information. 
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Random Walk theory [28], which suggested that movements and variations in stock price 
behavior are not predictable, gained further support following the publication of the 
popular book, A Random Walk Down Wall Street written by Burton G. Malkiel in 1973 
[29] in which he famously compared highly paid stock market analysts with “bare-assed 
apes” throwing darts at a dartboard in their attempts to pick stock market winners.  
  In favor for much of the 1970’s, the rationalists sought to explain the behavior of 
financial markets by suggesting that stocks are priced rationally because they reflect in 
their prices all relevant information available to all investors and that those investors react 
rationally to that information in their investment behavior. This suggests that investors 
are not likely to improve their returns above that of the overall market because it would 
incur significant risk. By following a pattern of rational behavior with regard to their 
investments, they can only hope to equal the performance of the overall market itself 
because other investors have access to, and react in similar rational ways to, the same 
information. Stock prices therefore reflect the tension between informed investors and 
uninformed investors and are the best estimate of investor’s awareness of all relevant 
market information, therefore the market is deemed to be efficient.  
 
2.2.3 Behavioural Finance 
 
Rationalist theories of stock market behavior came into question as researchers began to 
observe that there were inconsistencies in the theory of Utility and the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis. A challenge to the rational theory of markets came in the late 1960’ and early 
1970’s with the growth of Cognitive Psychology [29] which began to describe the brain 
as an information-processing device and to study the ways in which it made decisions 




Behavioral finance researchers have established credible scientific evidence [14, 15, 16, 
33, 34] that we are not rational beings and that we react to many situations and conditions 
in irrational ways. The argument proposed by [16] in their seminal paper introducing 
prospect theory, was that human behavior is not rational and explained a number of 
documented anomalies in rational economic decision-making. For example, it is human 
nature to expect to improve upon an expected return or result by taking increased risk. If 
investors believed that they could not improve upon average market returns they would 
all be investing in index tracking funds that track an index of stocks with an expected 
return of no more or no less than the overall market performance itself. In addition, access 
to information is not uniform and hedge fund managers or professional research analysts 
are privy to more information about a particular stock than the majority of other investors. 
Prospect theory has a special relevance to electronic traders because the biases that the 
theory describes can be observed and documented in a range of different conditions and 
on varying timescales. The irrationality of human risk-taking behaviour is evident in the 
short-term activities of traders trading on electronic markets with regard to realizing gains 
too quickly and letting losses run for example. The reluctance to let profits run and the 
tendency to let losses accumulate is well documented in studies related to trading 
behaviour. This thesis seeks to extend the current literature into a new area of study where 
the behaviour of electronic traders is quantified in very short-term trading intervals, using 
a range of metrics described earlier in the thesis, and assistance is provided in the form of 
a supporting tool that reduces the behavioural biases that the literature describes.  
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  As behavioural finance developed, researchers looked at a series of biases. According 
to [30] the foundations of behavioral finance rest on three main themes: 
 Heuristics 
 Framing and 
 Market Inefficiencies and Anomalies 
Heuristics explains that people often make decisions based upon ‘rule of thumb’ or 
approximation rather than on rational analysis. One application of this theory is the 
availability heuristic [15] which describes how people base the probability of an outcome 
on how easy that outcome is to imagine. Vividly described emotionally charged outcomes 
will take precedence over those that are harder to imagine or understand leading to 
cognitive bias. In addition, [15] named and described the heuristic called Anchoring 
which refers to the way in which people estimate probabilities. According to the theory, 
people begin with a suggested reference point, an anchor, and then estimate away from 
that anchor in arriving at a probable outcome. Because the reference, or anchor, is higher, 
the expectation is normally higher.  Heuristics also include the theories of Loss Aversion 
[14, 15], Status Quo Bias [31] and Self-Serving Bias [32].   
  The second foundation of behavioral finance, framing [33], refers to the way in which a 
rational choice is presented to the individual, which in turn influences their decision-
making processes and causes cognitive bias. For example, in the insurance industry 
insurers are apt to tell us that the cost of life assurance is 60 cents a day instead of $219 a 
year. 60 cents a day sounds ludicrously cheap in the manner in which it is framed but a 
single payment of $219 for a year’s insurance cover sounds very different.  
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  The third foundation, market inefficiencies and anomalies [33], refers to the 
phenomenon of market outcomes that do not fit in with the Utility Theory of rational 
expectations. They relate directly to the phenomenon of investor herd instinct [34], or 
group bias [35], which is strongly emphasized during stock market bubbles and busts and 
irrational manias during which investors seem to abandon all attempts to invest according 
to fundamentals but instead are overpowered by the emotions of fear and greed. As related 
earlier in the Chapter, [27] believed that behavioral finance constitutes a collection of 
anomalies rather than being representative of a true branch of finance and suggested that 
these anomalies would eventually be eradicated through the application of the efficient 
market’s theorem. However, the time that elapses between the preliminary deviations 
from the fair value of an asset to the moment when it reverts back to its fair value through 
the mechanics of efficient markets, can be extremely long as witnessed by several recent 
stock market booms and busts.  
It is useful at this stage to categorise the various biases and heuristics under the following 
three topics that are related to the central theme of this thesis. This shows the relationship 
between the different biases and the specific area of interest.  
 
Loss Aversion Market inefficiencies and anomalies Mistaken 
Beliefs: Illusory and Invisible Correlations.  
Disposition Effect Framing, judgment under uncertainty, the 
Disposition Effect and the Framing of Investment 
Choices, Risk Aversion, the Disposition Effect and 
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Mental Accounting Biases: Values and 
Preferences. 
Optimism Bias Status Quo Bias, Self-Serving Bias Confirmation 
Bias, Under- reaction and Over-reaction 
 
Table 1 Categories of Traditional Behavioural Biases  
The categories in Table 1 show links between the main themes in the thesis, Loss Aversion, 
Disposition Effect and Optimism Bias and the area of study that have been undertaken that support 
them.  
 
2.2.4 Trading Psychology 
 
Trader behaviour analysis has traditionally focused on topics ranging from 
overconfidence in decision-making [18], the disposition effect [17], and judgment under 
uncertainty [15]. Recently research has spread into areas that consider other topics that 
influence trader decision-making and success; traders’ ability to learn [36] from their 
trading activity [37], the impact of the environment on their trading performance [35] and 
the effects on performance of peer group pressure [35]. In addition, emphasis has been 
placed on the relationship between experience and trader performance and the adoption 
of ‘private signal precision’ [36], a phenomenon whereby a trader is able to maximize 
higher risk-adjusted abnormal returns from more precise utilization of accurate 
information directly linked to trading outperformance. The broadening of research topics 
to include direct learning experiences, non-trading influences on risk and performance 
and the filtering of information with regard to its adoption in precision-tasks leading to 
outperformance lead to interesting insights into this developing area of study [38]. Hilton 
[35] identifies certain human behavioural traits that can interfere with effective decision-
making and cause some degree of risk. These include Confirmation Bias, Optimism Bias 
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and the Illusion of control, Overconfidence in Predictions, Mistaken Beliefs: Illusory and 
Invisible Correlations. Risk Aversion, the Disposition Effect and the Framing of 
Investment Choices, Under- reaction and Over-reaction and Mental Accounting Biases: 
Values and Preferences. Confirmation Bias is the need for confirmation in making 
decisions. In an interesting study, [39] researchers found that those traders who were able 
to resist Confirmation Bias actually made more money than traders who weren’t. Instead 
of using available information from dubious sources to confirm their trading decisions, 
they reacted to market information dispassionately and were free from False Consensus 
Bias [40]; that is, the tendency to overestimate the number of people who share your 
preferences. Optimism bias, [19] refers to the tendency people have in believing that they 
are better than average and that misfortune is likely to befall someone else rather than 
themselves. Overconfidence in Predictions [35] is referred to as the “pervasive inaccuracy 
of expert prediction”. Hilton [35] cites a number of other instances of experts making 
inaccurate predictions.  
  The behavioral finance literature also suggests that certain market anomalies are 
consistent with the presence of irrational trading by investors [35]. For example, [41] 
finds that small retail investors appear to hold losing trades longer than winning trades 
and also shows that this phenomenon can be costly, because the winners sold by retail 
traders subsequently outperform the losers that they continue to hold. Coval and 
Shumway [42] also infer from the observed behavior and costs that these retail traders 
suffer from the disposition effect, a combination of mental accounting (irrational analysis 
of existing positions) and prospect theory (asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses). 
Hilton [35] also suggests however, financial markets are rife with illusory correlations 
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not only in terms of products but also beliefs that inaccurately suppose a relationship 
between a certain type of action and effect. Hilton [35] describes the way in which trading 
managers typically over-attribute better than average trading performance to speculative 
positioning, while failing to take into account the consistently profitable market maker’s 
spread. Braas and Bralver [43] attribute this false correlation to a “fundamental attribution 
error” in that managers can over-attribute trader performance to the person rather than to 
the situation. Steenbarger [44] states, success leading to overconfidence can have a 
negative effect on a trader’s activity. “Feeling overconfident…becomes a cue that triggers 
cautious behavior –the opposite response from the one that normally would arise”.  
2.2.5 Psycho-physiological studies 
 
Lo and Repin [45] have written extensively on the psycho-physiological characteristics 
of traders and how their psycho-physiology adapts and changes according to the risk 
processing they undertake in their trading work. Lo [46] challenges the efficient markets 
hypothesis. He believes that recent research in the cognitive sciences and financial 
economics has suggested an important link between rationality in decision-making and 
emotion implying that the two notions are not antithetical but in fact complimentary. Lo 
[46] studies professional trader’s decision-making and emotion by measuring the realtime 
psycho- physiological characteristics including skin conductance, blood volume, pulse, 
heart rate, electromyographical signals, respiration, and the body temperature of 
professional securities traders.  
  Peer group pressure studies in trader behaviour include “groupthink,” [35] a somewhat 
negative process “whereby a group of individuals mutually reinforce each other into 
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believing that their collective viewpoint is right” [35] and that they are more likely to 
accept risker choices after group discussion.   
  In a simplified form, behavioral finance seeks to understand why people make decisions 
to buy or sell. Later in 2005 [42] showed that CBOT traders are subject to expected Utility 
theory by observing certain psychological preferences in morning and afternoon trading 
behaviour.  
 
2.2.6 Emotion and Intuition 
 
While adopting a “Closed Skill Performance”[47] is fine for scenarios that tend repeat 
themselves, new situations demand responses that are more likely to be governed by 
emotion and intuition. There is a belief among those involved in daily critical point 
activities, where the critical activity is likely to be the objective to save life or to avoid 
disaster, that for fire service personnel, soldiers and futures traders “in a fluid, competitive 
environment, the best decisions come from intuition” [48]. A fluid environment is an 
environment in which there is constant change and in which those involved need to 
constantly reappraise their actions and modify them quickly depending on the changing 
circumstances. Security and emergency services personnel confront critical point 
activities often on a daily basis when the must make rapid and effective decisions on the 
spur of the moment. Why is this the case, however? Surely a rational approach weighing 
up the main body of information available before making a reasoned decision to act in a 
certain way would be more beneficial? This is not necessarily the case. A body of research 
now focusing on the phenomenon of gut instinct suggests that “instinct, hunch or learning 
without awareness” [49] compensates for the lack of solid information available to people 
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in uncertain and rapidly changing situations and is a real form of knowledge. The belief 
is that people who make decisions in chaotic or complex circumstances and situations 
like a battlefield, a full-scale industrial chemical fire, a trading floor or in a competitive 
business environment need to employ the use of intuition as readily as rational decision 
making processes. What then is intuition? One suggestion is that it is a naturally formed 
emotive response to uncertain and chaotic external stimuli of which we have little 
preconceived experience but must react to instantly. Emotion, one of our primeval 
cognitive processes, must then play a large part in decision-making. Interestingly, traders 
are constantly told to eradicate emotion from trading. It can be argued that it is emotion 
that forms the basis of all our decision-making processes, including intuition and that it 
should be encouraged rather than suppressed. Emotion acts like the spark plug in a car 
engine forming the first spark that ignites the gas in the cylinders that in turn powers the 
pistons. Without the spark, the engine wouldn’t have a preliminary burst of energy and 
subsequently would not run. Similarly, if we couldn’t employ emotion in trading, we 
would have nothing to base our best instinctive trading decisions on. Intuition, according 
to [50] is kick-started by emotion, which presents the conscious, logical mind with a short 
list of possibilities from which to choose from.  
While studying firefighters under pressure to make realtime decisions at critical points 
during their work fighting dangerous fires, [49] concluded that under conditions similar 
to those experienced during war, firefighters proceed by grabbing the first good idea that 
comes to mind, and then the next, and then the next forming a string of reactions fashioned 
by instinct. While basing their reactions to difficult and complex situations on the 
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knowledge pool they had built through experience, they still tended to fight fires largely 
with their gut feeling.  
 “The intuitive approach is more appropriate for the vast majority of…decisions made in 
the fluid, rapidly changing conditions of war when time and uncertainty are critical 
factors, and creativity is a desirable trait” [48]. 
On a different approach, neuroscience research has been undertaken into the activation of 
the reward system results in particular types of behaviour and emotion, characterized 
among investors as greater risk-taking, increased impulsivity, enhanced positive feelings, 
and greater physical arousal [51]. Loss avoidance behaviour and emotions are timid, 
protective, fearful, and risk-averse. When activated among large groups, reward approach 
behaviour can impact the economy as a whole, leading to stock market bubbles, increased 
consumer purchasing, higher investment risk-taking, and an increased use of credit. Loss 
avoidance, on the other hand, is seen when people decrease borrowing, sell off assets, and 
report decreased financial confidence (and even fear) [51]. 
 
2.2.7 The Structure and Process of Decision-Making 
 
In their paper [52] began by explaining that although much research had been conducted 
into the structure and process of decision-making including risk-less versus risky choice, 
and normative versus descriptive choice models, little had been undertaken to determine 
if novice decision-makers can be trained to become more expert decision-makers. They 
believed that investment decision-making constitutes a useful example of this skill 
because performance can be measured exactly. They depart from the traditional 
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behavioral finance bias of predicting and understanding market behavior that tends to 
have more of an impact on financial strategy, towards engendering an understanding of 
the individual’s decision-making processes [35]. Hilton [35] also argues that psychology 
can be applied to “decision-training and decision-aiding as well as financial product 
marketing and the traditional human resource management concerns of recruitment, 
training, compensation and control.” This fits in with current demands in the financial 
services industry with the need to train electronic traders and to nurture their decision-
making behavior and cognitive biases. This approach also reflects a lot of the work being 
undertaken by psychology professionals and psychiatrists in financial markets who are 
being hired by prominent trading companies and proprietary trading houses to create 
educational and behavioral teaching environments for their electronic traders [44]. As the 
complexity and challenge of trading electronically increases and the profitable edge 
becomes more elusive, proprietary trading companies are seeking ways in which to 
improve or maintain the profitable performance of their traders.  
 
2.2.8 The High Frequency Trading Market 
 
Electronic traders have been utilizing automated order entry tools and techniques for 
several years. They seek to reduce error-prone human input into trading systems and to 
customize order entry processes according to market conditions. However, more recently 
automated order entry tools have become extremely sophisticated and have in many 
instances completely taken over from human order input. It is not surprising then that the 
types of order entry tool used by traders will have a direct impact on their trading 
environment. The use of simple automated trading tools that input limit buy and limit sell 
orders has at least one positive effect; that is, these tools alleviate the need for manual 
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order entry and free up the trader’s time and mental faculties so that they can concentrate 
on other more important things. This type of simple tool has a positive influence on traders 
as one of the most difficult decisions a trader has to make is at what point he should look 
to get into the market.  Automated tools that simply input limit orders above and beneath 
the market best bid and offer price are not sophisticated and can be built relatively quickly 
using customizable scripts and programs that are readily available. Some trading 
companies [44] offer their traders a suite of automated order entry tools to choose from, 
many provided by the front-end trading software vendors for use with their own trading 
software, while others are created internally for the trading company independently of the 
software vendors.  As [35] stated in 2001, research needs to be done to identify the 
characteristics of successful traders.  
2.2.9 Replacing the human trader – developing robotic tools 
 
Researchers and academics have been at pains to try and create models and robots to 
undertake the functions of human traders in competitive market settings. By doing this, 
they have tested and modelled results from a range of experimental conditions mostly 
other than those representing the real markets themselves. Recently, in 2012 for example, 
an attempt to interpret trader decision making “in the wild” by [20] relied upon in-depth 
interviews and a qualitative approach to the research. Completely automated markets 
where human traders do not exist have further social complications: “The changing 
human and social factors, emotional and otherwise, affecting business or trading practices 
and the sets of possible outcomes cannot all be incorporated into any model, no matter 
how complex” [8]. Behavioral finance research demonstrates how psychological forces 
influence investor decisions and cause financial markets to behave inefficiently. Through 
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the use of theoretical models there is evidence that mispricing occurs when inexperienced 
traders coexist with “behavioural” agents [8] that display cognitive impairment that leads 
them to make a range of errors. For example, behavioral agents may be noise (irrational) 
traders, as in [53] or suffer from overconfidence [35]. Research suggests [34] that herd 
instinct is caused by a large number of agents who suffer from behavioral biases leading 
to “herd behavior and momentum trading that contributes to financial volatility”. 
Successful trading behavior has traditionally attracted interest from academics as worthy 
of research for several reasons: firstly, it enables the study of a synthesis of human 
cognitive processes and biases through decision-making under uncertainty, many of 
which can be defined through the practice of trading or risk taking; secondly, the act of 
trading itself can be replicated in a laboratory through the use of portable trading systems 
and equipment and simulated trading markets that perfectly reproduce real, live market 
conditions. Thus results gained form observations in the field and can be compared to 
those established under laboratory conditions; thirdly, research subjects are able to 
articulate their reasons for making certain trading choices to researchers; and fourthly, 
their physiology can be observed during changing market conditions and fluctuating 
emotional levels [45]. Traders have been studied in relation to the irrationality in human 
decision-making with regard to financial markets and [33] [34] [35] [42] [54] have been 
making inroads into this area of research notably with papers on information accessing, 
overconfidence, and psychological dispositions that affect trading behavior and financial 
decision making. A paper related to this subject matter titled Training Novices to become 
more expert: The Role of Information Accessing Strategy was published in 2001 [55], 
followed by the publication of The Psychology of Financial Decision-Making: 
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Applications to Trading, Dealing and Investment Analysis [35] in the same year, followed 
a year later with a joint paper published with his aforementioned associates titled 
Psychological Dispositions and Trading Behavior. With regard to securities trading, itself 
a stressful environment in which its participants undertake critical point decision-making, 
research has been undertaken by prominent academics [45] into trader intuition and the 
link between decision-making and emotion. In a working paper they studied the 
importance of emotion in the decision-making process of professional securities traders 
by measuring their physiological characteristics while trading. They monitored skin 
conductance, blood volume pulse and heart rate, electromyographic data (muscle action), 
respiration rate and body temperature, while simultaneously capturing the market 
environment in which the traders are active real time. They suggested in their results that 
“expert’s judgments are often based on intuition, not explicit analytical processing, 
making it almost impossible to explain or replicate the process of how that judgment was 
formed.” In addition, [45] states that “Traders often based their intuition about price 
swings and market dynamics without the ability (or the need) to articulate a precise 
quantitative algorithm for making these complex decisions.” They suggested that a 
trader’s “intuitive trading “rules” are based on the associations and relations between 
various information tokens that are formed on a subconscious level, and our findings, and 
those in the extant cognitive sciences literature, suggest that decisions based on the 
intuitive judgments require not only cognitive but also emotional mechanisms.” In 
conclusion to their paper, [45] states “our results indicate that emotion is a significant 




2.2.10 The current approach to studying trader behaviour 
Evaluating the micro-factors influencing the behavior of financial experts has been 
challenging for researchers mainly because of the difficulty in examining experts under 
ecologically valid conditions that are representative of the domain of expertise [56] along 
with the scarcity of richly detailed high-density data. Research into expert behavior has 
focused on available data sets which have tended to be broad and universal rather than 
detailed and specific. One early exception is [57] who used a data set of 334 floor traders 
conducting at least five trades on ten different days during the calendar year 1995 but the 
data set does not compare to the high-frequency data set today. “The data do not allow a 
sequencing of these intra-minute trades, which makes some behavioral inferences from 
these trades problematic.” In the majority of cases, the emphasis in research is very much 
on ‘observation and report’ and much of the research that has been conducted relies on 
surveys and the personal accounts of the research subjects. The following excerpt from a 
recent piece of research highlights this fact:   
“Subjects were asked to fill out surveys that recorded their psychological profiles 
before and after their training program, and during the course of the program 
(involving live trading through their own personal accounts) subjects were asked to 
fill out surveys at the end of each trading day which were designed to measure their 
emotional state and their trading performance for that day” [58].  
They went on to say that “Because our subjects were geographically dispersed throughout 
the United States, and because the duration of the study was several weeks, the most 
practical methods for assessing emotional state and psychological profile were online 
questionnaires. Therefore, we asked the participants to complete several survey 
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instruments prior to, during each day of, and after the training program. Subjects filled out 
all questionnaires online at our web site, using their trading identifiers to obtain authorized 
access”.  
The approach to effective experience-sampling documented by [59] rests on the notion 
that individual behaviour and its underlying psychological mechanisms must be studied 
within their natural settings. They put forward three different types of experience-
sampling designs: 
 subjects are required to regularly report on their behaviour and experiences at 
pre-specified intervals (for example hourly or daily) 
 subjects may complete self-reports once a certain event occurs (for example 
conflicts or intimacy). 
 subjects may be prompted by randomly sent signals to complete self-reports. 
This type is referred to as signal-contingent sampling and is advantageous, as it 
captures the variability of experiences given sufficient numbers of responses. 
 
Others suggest that the experience-sampling approach, ‘observation and report’ 
interpretation, does not go far enough in accurately determining the true cognitive and 
emotional triggers that lead to successful trading behaviour. For example, empirical 
studies of behavioural decision-making biases in economic situations of expected profit 
or loss have tended to concentrate on abstract problems (choices between gambles 
represented by probabilities and decision making biases). As suggested by several 





The study of human traders and their trading activity has, to date, involved very little 
interpretation of realtime transaction data in situ and in the context in which it is created. 
Although this has been a goal for researchers of the theory of probabilistic functioning as 
far back as 60 years [60] early research efforts suggested that there were few occasions 
when experts can be properly studied in the field [56]. We see that there has been 
difficulty in qualifying and quantifying the trader’s digital audit trail right up to the 
present day. In addition, [2] remarks on the difficulties in studying HFT data in this 
respect.   
Achieving these “few instances of real-life expertise in which superior performance can 
be demonstrated under relatively standard conditions” [56] is now possible in the study 
of data via a comprehensive audit trail showing the trading conditions of electronic 
markets. Through the realtime capture of trading activity via a standard Application 
Programmable Interface (API) and related databases, we can assimilate, observe and 
record a trader’s complete behavioural response to market conditions. MacAndrew and 
Gore [20] believe that  
 
“We are also aware of the difficulty of comparing findings from studies of cognition 
in the wild with those from description and experience-based choice within the 
laboratory, and we acknowledge that this opens the possibility that our findings are 
a function of method. Future work might rectify these shortcomings by focusing 
attention on the development of quasi-experimental approaches to accessing 
cognition in applied settings. ACTA (Applied Cognitive Task Analysis) provides a 
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theoretically grounded foundation for the development of instructional content for 
this objective.” 
They also stated that  
“It is also anticipated that improved understanding of how attitudes toward risk 
concerning gains and losses deviate from studies of description and experience-
based choice in the laboratory when studied “in the wild” will hold significant 
implications for other domains beyond the immediate field of application”  
In order to generate their own data owing to the scarcity of real-world data, academics 
have created experimental designs using a variety of different techniques including 
“purposely controlled experimental markets” [61]. For example, a popular experimental 
design is the call market [62] [63]. The potential problem with this type of experimental 
market is that it does not represent the real trading world and as such, remains theoretical 
in its application. Indeed [64] views experimental research as flawed because its very 
design forces the human subject to behave robotically, especially in light of research that 
appeared to indicate that market behavior was largely independent of agents being 
computerized robots or human subjects who participated in an automated laboratory 
experiment. 
  In their paper [56] suggest that scientific understanding of financial markets and 
behavior is more likely to improve from the study of financial experts in ecologically 
valid tasks than simply from studies of unskilled participants performing abstract 
laboratory tasks. Nearer to the goal [65] use individual local futures trader’s trade data 
provided by the Sydney Futures Exchange to study the house money effect on local 
traders. The trade data enabled them to reconstruct the inventory positions of individual 
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trader's accounts on a trade-by-trade basis but did not provide the granularity of the 
trader’s complete realtime audit trail that forms the basis of this thesis. The unique data 
set used in this thesis includes all limit orders, cancel replace orders, stop loss limits, the 
time of transaction down to the millisecond, the verb, and the profit and loss from the 
trader’s trading activity.  There are more recent exceptions where large volume trading 
data sets have been available by private arrangement, [66] but the interpretation is rarely 
individual to each trader involved but more of an appreciation of volume trading 
conditions on an objective level. The difficulty in being able to access and appropriate 
valuable trader-defined trading data sets is due largely to private corporate unwillingness 
to provide such data for fear of legal compliance and losing proprietary trading secrets. 
This is understandable and has, so far, impeded detailed and comprehensive work related 
to human trading behaviour. Moreover, there has been a reluctance to draw conclusions 
from studying trading data and patterns in trading behaviour [67] because the conclusions 
have not been directly observed.  
 
Owing to the difficulty in gathering rich realtime data sets, then, researchers have used 
different methods to replicate trading environments rather than to use the realtime 
financial markets. For example, several experimental findings have concentrated on the 
provision of games, constructed markets in non-contextual situations, and created call 
markets and double-auction type transaction environments [68]. While the research 
findings of these studies have been meaningful and useful, little work has been done to 
study the trader in situ, in realtime and in context and thus to broaden the research of 
human traders in the field. This has resulted in an underdeveloped understanding of 
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human trader behaviour which, in turn, has prohibited a full appreciation of their impact 
on markets and their potentially positive future. By not having access to rich realtime 
datasets or appropriate tools and study methods, researchers have so far missed the 
opportunity to apply useful findings to real-world contexts and to examine the opportunity 
for future development of the human trader.  
 
Instead, evaluating trader behaviour has traditionally involved gathering results from a 
mix of qualitative research methods including experience sampling (ESM), interviews, 
and questionnaires [20]. It is evident that things are changing rapidly and research 
techniques and approaches need to be created to keep up with these changes if data is to 
have meaning. Research must change to reflect the changes in the way that markets 




The study of trader behaviour has been undertaken over many years. Its long history has 
covered many areas. Indeed, behavioral finance is underpinned by the assumption that 
markets are influenced by the personal characteristics of participants and the decisions 
that they make. However, in the application of its findings it tends to influence financial 
strategy with its focus on predicting and understanding market behavior rather than on 
promoting understanding of the decision-making processes of the individuals that make 
up the markets. It is interesting to observe that the roots of behavioral finance go as far 
back as the 18th century and, at this stage, it would be useful to provide a breakdown as 
to how this came about. The array of different decision making responses can be broadly 
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transcribed into three potential outcomes: a profit, a loss or a scratch (a scratch trade is 
where a trader opens and closes a position with no loss or profit.). Traders who access 
markets like the London Stock Exchange or the various financial futures markets have a 






























This Chapter describes the ways in which trading data is traditionally assessed, the many 
challenges confronting academics especially with regard to assessing high-frequency trading 
data and how human trader data could provide a meaningful opportunity to expand the 
behavioural work in the decision sciences. The Chapter explores the approach by academics to 
deconstruct and find meaning in the data sets provided by high-frequency trading and how this is 
becoming more difficult. The Chapter introduces a new model with which to interpret and 
deconstruct human trader behaviour in a realtime setting with a view to using the output in 




It is surprising that, in 2016, the study of trading professionals in situ and in realime using 
realtime tools, has posed such a problem for researchers. However, this undertaking has 
become even more challenging owing to the intense speed of the markets. With trading 
speed now reduced to microseconds [1] [2] it is challenging to make sense of the data. In 
addition, evaluating the factors influencing the behavior of financial experts has been 
challenging for researchers mainly because of the difficulty in examining them under 
48 
 
ecologically valid conditions that are representative of the domain of expertise [56] along 
with the scarcity of richly detailed high-density data [42]. As a result of the scarcity of 
rich data sets, valuable research into financial expertise and behavioral finance has relied 
on practical experiments using uninformed, non-expert participants in trading games and 
laboratory experiments in order to arrive at theories on risk, gambling or other heuristics 
that are then applied to experts in the field [35]. In fact, some researchers have stated that 
field studies can only provide for rather crude tests of qualitative predictions, because 
probabilities and utilities cannot be accurately measured in such contexts [29]. However, 
through the reliance on laboratory experiments and on non-expert participant advances in 
the empirical study of financial expertise have been initiated, but are far from complete. 
In the realm of financial expertise and trading there is a need to identify and to quantify 
what makes a trader successful [51]. 
  The unique data set used in this thesis includes all limit orders, cancel replace orders, 
stop loss limits, the time of transaction down to the millisecond, the verb (buy or sell), 
and the profit and loss from the trader’s trading activity. Coupled with the millisecond 
price changes that are linked to trading activity, the data is very detailed. With the rich 
data set that forms the basis of this thesis, much can be discovered that has previously 
been hidden or unverified. By capturing a full digital audit trail from each trader, as well 
as the price information generated at the exchange interface and matching engine with 
which they are communicating, the data set forms the basis of a unique research 
opportunity into human behaviour when making risky trading decisions during the trading 
day.   
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  In the research we can observe realtime trader behavior in a standard data format, 
compare different trader’s realtime data using the same time sequences, trading 
instruments and markets, distill individual behavioural characteristics of each trader from 
the standard data format, compare one or more trader’s behavior using the same standard 
format at different time intervals, formulate a grading procedure for recognizing and 
comparing excellent trading behavior, observe and quantify different forms of behavior 
under various live market conditions, and replicate live market conditions in a simulated 
form so that behavioural characteristics can be observed and tested in a laboratory setting.      
  In addition, individual realtime trading processes can be identified and recorded, mapped 
to the market conditions in which they prevail and observed across different timescales, 
events and risk environments [44]. In this case, traders who were used in the sample can 
be observed over different time periods, different markets conditions and using different 
products as well as in relation to each other. Each component of the trader data set was 
mapped against the market conditions with regard to the current traded price of the trading 
instrument. By comparison, a significant drawback to the analysis of historical data 
occurs when particular segments or snapshots of trading activity cannot be accurately 
linked to the market scenarios to which they belong so that any assessment work that does 
not map the actual millisecond market event to the associated trading activity is flawed 
from the start. The approach adopted in this thesis is to examine microscopic trader data 
rather than to rely on experimental or questionnaire driven results. The data has been 
drawn from real live trading during the period June 2014 and November 2015. The traders 
in this research communicate electronically via their computers with exchange matching 
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engines and market transaction facilities (MTFs) at realtime speed via price and trade 
feeds.  
 
Traders originate electronic orders from front-end trading systems designed to transmit 
order messages via transaction messaging protocols at speeds as fast as microseconds. 
The push towards time duration of one billionth of a second, a nanosecond, is well 
underway. The nature of electronic markets with their capacity for recording data means 
that every action that a trader, trading system or other network node performs is captured 
in a microscopic digital audit trail. For research purposes the trader’s audit trail needs to 
be linked perfectly with the exchange’s trade and order price data so that order, 
transaction, time and traded price can all be perfectly synthesized. It is this comprehensive 
audit trail that provides a window into the richness of the trader’s behavior under various 
rules and constraints. Of critical importance to the research into trader behaviour is that 
every action a trader takes on his front-end trading system, be it manual or automated, 
realtime order management, risk management or trade reporting is recorded via the same 
realtime digital audit trail as other traders to create consistency. Through the study of 
trading and price data captured via the digital audit trail of futures day traders, this thesis 
shows that it is possible to evaluate expert behavior in situ and in realtime. Such research 
does not rely on using uninformed, non-expert participants but instead, enables 
researchers to evaluate financial experts in ecologically valid conditions that are 
representative of the domain of expertise. Now that this opportunity has arisen, research 
opportunity has been opened up into many different decision making areas linked to the 




As highlighted in Chapter 2 the thesis builds on the foundations of behavioural finance 
and risky-decision choice by creating a realime environment for human-decision making 
under risk to be studied. The objective is to observe the risk-taking behaviour of the trader 
in realtime and to then assist them to make meaningful trading decisions that reduce the 
behavioural biases described in the literature while increasing the efficiency and 
profitability of the trader. There are great benefits to being able to study traders in realtime 
with reference to their context [16]. When commenting on the Technical Rational model 
of psychology research, which forms an antithesis to the humanistic approach to 
psychology exemplified by counseling psychology, [69]  commented in 2001 that such 
“research is constrained by notions of good design often inappropriate to complex life 
situations.”  Electronic trading is one of the only human activities that involve economical 
risky decision making that can be captured in a complete microsecond audit trail which 
can be studied in depth and in realtime. Being able to capture and map realtime human 
behaviour then leads to the opportunity to create new behavioural constructs and models 
at the edge of realtime. As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, there are recent 
examples of realtime analysis of market microstructure performance using a number of 
variables [70]. Volatility, the bid/ask spread and traded volumes are the variables 
commonly used in assessing quantitative trading. Where the current thesis differs is in the 
assessment of many more variables, the behavioural meaning behind the results and the 
creation of new realtime behavioural models in order to link this data with the 




3.2 Modelling Trader Behaviour 
 
The idea behind producing a new realtime behavioural interventionist model for trading 
is to provide a general framework for understanding and interpreting human realtime 
risky decisions and for providing means and methods for data capture, display and 
analysis. Because the modelling of realtime trader behaviour has not been achieved before 
in a contextual and live environment this new approach provides several promising 
research opportunities. Realtime trading behaviour provides a unique modelling 
opportunity with regard to human judgment and decision making under stress. This makes 
it suitable for comprehensive academic study. The examples below show a small range 
of the possibilities for further research work based on this model: 
 
1. The trading environment is standardized in respect to pricing conventions and 
order types (limit, market, immediate or cancel, stop loss), the computerized 
process inherent in the transaction cycle, the formulation by the trading system of 
order, price and trade data and their display, storage and retrieval options and the 
market environment as a whole. This means that trader decision making process, 
actions and outcomes can be studied over time and between different traders, or 
groups of traders so that the data set is more complete. The standardized nature of 
the environment and the variable nature of trading behaviour is then comparable.   
2. Traders have a strong monetary incentive to make the right trading decision that 
results in a profit but accept that they may well make a wrong decision resulting 
in a loss. The act of attempting to make the right decision means that the trading 
experience is directly comparable to the risks associated with it in a meaningful 
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way and can be viewed as being representative of a structured research 
environment.  
3. In addition, it makes the prospect of designing laboratory experiments to replicate 
real-world setting more plausible.  
4. Making a correct decision that results in a profit relies on a combination of 
experience, understanding the way in which the trading environment (the market) 
works, and how the trader visualizes the price activity of the trading instrument. 
Correct trading decisions that result in profits, for example, can then be mapped 
to the price activity of the market condition perfectly.  
5. Traders are subject to different transaction cost constraints on their profitability 
with the advantage falling on the traders with lower transaction costs. Transaction 
cost analysis (TCA) can then be studied with regard to the market impact of 
trading strategy especially as an increase in the number of trades will directly 
increase trading costs thus reducing profitability. Economy, with regard to the 
number of trades, is a goal of many traders.  
6. A wrong trading decision that results in a loss is often seen as being part of the 
job or the cost of doing business. A loss is not necessarily a bad thing, but is 
accepted as part of the life of a trader in the same way that any business incurs 
costs associated with marketing, sales and other aspects of its daily operation. As 
the cost of doing business, losses can be analysed in the conditions that cause them 
and a direct assessment can be made relating to trader behaviour.   
7. Traders who make mistakes in that their decisions result in loss are able to conduct 
the same trading behavior or trading strategy at a different time or in a different 
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market condition and make a profit. The comparisons that can be made between 
trading times and trading scenarios are of great value as they provide evidence of 
strategic success or failure in nearly identical settings. The results can then be used 
to modify trading strategy.  
8. Trading success is heavily influenced by the correct timing of orders and traders 
grow to recognize certain market conditions that lend themselves positively to 
timing in producing trading profitability.  
9. The recovery time that traders require to compose themselves after making an 
unexpected loss, whereby they accept the loss and are then able to start trading 
again, differs between traders and is not necessarily a function of maturity, 
experience or skill.  
10. The time taken to remove the emotional input from a losing trade may lengthen 
the time between closing a losing trade and opening a new position which could 
be of significance to risk management.     
11. There is sometimes a positive outcome from delaying decision making processes 
that result in reduced loss or improved profit. 
As can be seen in the above examples, the structure of the realtime trading domain, and 
the new way in which data sets can be analysed explained in this Chapter, lends itself to 
the modelling of trader behaviour in a realtime setting which has important ramifications 
for future research into human risky decision-making. Experiments can be devised that 
test a number of hypothesis regarding human realtime decision-making including those 
of active futures trading.  
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The first objective of any new model in establishing a framework for analysis is to capture 
and interpret the digital audit trail provided by the trading front-end system. The 
behavioural interventionist model featured in this thesis is explained in Chapter 5.  
 
3.2.1 Realtime Trading Data Sampler (RTDS) 
 
As highlighted in the recent literature, financial markets data can be captured down to the 
microsecond but the problem, researchers believe, is that it is complex and hard to study 
[2] making it nearly impossible to analyse. Researchers believe that “new tools need to 
be developed for empirical analysis” [3] with regard to complex high-frequency trading 
data sets and this thesis provides evidence of such a tool through the creation of the 
Realtime Trading Data Sampler (RTDS). An additional worry that researchers have is 
that the value of rich data sets in the discovery of behavioural decision-making processes 
is diminished if the data is too dense [3]. This is not the case with the approach described 
in this thesis. RTDS is able to provide a clean, realtime analysis of realtime data in all its 
complexity at the millisecond level.  
  The RTDS analytical software was created for the express purpose of the requirements 
of the experiments described in this thesis. The software was written in C#, .NET 4.0. It 
is a WinForms application with a Windows Service for the server and an SQLite database. 
The objective is to turn it into a web-based application that will make it easier to distribute 
and setup, and, most importantly, it will be cross-platform, running on Linux, Windows, 
OS X, and tablets as well as mobile devices. In this case it would be written in JavaScript, 
with HTML and CSS for the front-end. RTDS, with its selection of 127 metrics (see 
Appendix 1), links directly into the trading price dissemination, front-end order entry and 
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order management system that the traders use for trading, so that the trader’s digital audit 
trail is immediately visible while the trader is trading in situ. In its current form, the 
software captures data realtime from a communication link via the trading software 
Application Programmable Interface (API) whereby it receives price, order and trade data 
by interfacing with the exchange gateway and receiving messages from the market data 
API and the order and trade servers at the exchange back-end. It transposes and calculates, 
by way of the metrics, ratios and figures, the digital audit trail of the trader’s trading 
activity while it is action. This coordinated activity enables RTDS to provide evidence of 
realtime trading behaviour that is matched perfectly with the realtime price, trade and 
traded volume data provided by the exchange. Figure 1 (below) shows RTDS with a range 
of metrics and the GUI design. The data presented in the GUI window is the number of 
consecutive winning trades that this particular trader has generated. The researcher can 
tab between the different metrics and load the visual graphic onto the GUI. Each order 
and trade that the trader generates is populated in the table at the base of the GUI and 




















Figure 1 Realtime Trading Data Sampler (RTDS)  
The RTDS clearly shows the frequency of the number of consecutively losing trades over a period 
of time The Y axis shows the number of consecutive winning trades and the X axis shows the 
time in hours.  
 
The metrics used in the experiments (Figure 2) were made visible in the software from 
the database of all available metrics. For our purposes we included a number of metrics 
that would provide evidence of the behavioural traits that had direct relevance to Loss 















Figure 2 Realtime Metrics in RTDS  
A range of Metrics can be chosen in RTDS to fit the required observation and various metrics are 
linked to particular biases as described in Chapter 1.  
 
There are, in this instance, four types of metrics:  
1. Base metrics including number of winning trades, number of losing trades, 
number of scratches (trades without profit or loss), average trade size, 
number of trades, number of orders, average profit and loss per trade and 
the ratio of winners to losers. 
2. Sequential metrics including consecutive winners and consecutive losers 
3. Time-based metrics including average time between trades and average 
time in trade,  
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4. Confidence metrics including maximum positive drift, maximum negative 
























Figure 3 Base Metrics Groups in RTDS 
 
 Figure 3 shows the groups of metrics that have been selected from the main list of 127 metrics 
for the experiments. The choice of the metrics was based upon the main objectives of the 
experiments in finding evidence of change in trader confidence in the three main categories of 
Loss Aversion, Disposition Effect and Overconfidence while trading in different conditions. Each 








3.2.1.1 Base metrics 
 
The base metrics form the simplest interpretation of the trader’s trading activity showing 
how well the trader is performing in the current market conditions. This data is used to 
establish the overall condition of profitability and to observe how the metrics show the 
trader’s behavioural condition; that is, are they relaxed, anxious, or indifferent to market 
activities? The pace of order entry is of interest showing the confidence of the trader’s 
interpretation of the market price movements and is directly linked with their profit/loss 
ratio so as to provide evidence of successful trading. The average trade sizes also show a 
level of confidence with regard to profitability as, in some instances, traders vary their 
trading size according to their degree of profit or loss, increasing trade size when loss 
making and reducing trade size when profitable. This fits in with the research conclusions 
made by [57] whereby professional CBOT traders became loss averse when they became 




















Figure 4 Base Metric Number of Winners in RTDS  
In Figure 4 The Base metrics, the number of winning trades is shown and as can be seen from the 
X and Y Axis, the time and the proportion of winners. As can be seen from this Figure, even a 
simple calculation of the number of winning trades shows a tendency of improvement after 14.30. 
This, in itself, is an interesting observation which, compared with other metrics like the frequency 
of orders and the time between trades can show a change in trader confidence.   
 
Average profit and loss per trade, as shown in Figure 5 demonstrates how trader 
profitability can change over time with, in this instance, a higher profitability per trade in 
the early part of the day and a sharp deterioration after midday and 15.00. This could be 
linked to the trader’s reactions to specific events so the data would be linked to time-of-














Figure 5 Average Profit and Loss per Trade in RTDS  
In Figure 5 the Average profit and loss per trade is a useful indicator of the efficiency of traders 
with regard to long term trading activities. The example data in Figure 4 has been captured over 
a full trading day and shows a defined variation in the performance behind the metrics.   
 
3.2.1.2 Sequential Metrics 
 
Sequential metrics, including consecutive winners and losers, provide evidence of 
confidence by looking at the speed with which traders add additional trades in winning 
scenarios and in losing scenarios. If traders follow up winning trades with additional 
orders this is evidence of a confident attitude to the current trading results and the market 
conditions. If the trader adds quickly to losing positions and subsequently loses again then 














Figure 6 Ratio of Winners to Losers in RTDS  
In Figure 6 we can see that the trader began the trading day with a good ratio of winning trades 
to losing trades but then lost (and regained) this success only to lose it after 16.00. This volatility 
in the ratio would suggest that the trader lacks consistency in his trading approach or that the 
market was very volatile.   
 
3.2.1.3 Inter-transactional intervals (ITI’s) and time taken metrics 
 
The time intervals between trades, or transaction duration, (that is, closing an open trade 
and then opening a new one), can provide us with useful about the trader’s behavior and, 
in particular, the trader’s current reaction to losses or profits. Gaps between trades differ 
according to the trader’s profit and loss condition and the state of the market. Rapid order 
(and subsequently trade) follow-up after a losing trade differed for winning trades. As a 
basis for the study the trader’s data was split into time intervals between closing trades 
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and opening new trades. Duration models focus on the times between events and, 
therefore, do not impose any sampling frequency assumptions.  
In the current context the event is defined as a non-zero price impact trade on the S&P 
500 Index futures market with the times between these events being referred to as 
transaction duration. A non-zero price impact trade is defined as a trade which contains a 
price that is different from the price observed in the previous trade. The method of 
examining time-interval metrics includes a number of metrics that focus specifically at 
times between trades. They include: Time Since Last Trade, Time Since Last Trade 
Winner, Time Since Last Trade Loser, Time Since Last Trade Scratch, Standard Deviation 
of Times Since Last Trade, Standard Deviation of Times Since Last Trade Winner, 
Standard Deviation of Times Since Last Trade Loser, and Standard Deviation of Times 
Since Last Trade Scratches. Inter-Transactional Intervals (ITI’s) studies traditionally do 
not link to behaviour. Instead they focus on price. Researchers believe that ITIs fluctuate 
randomly as do prices [71] and that dealers move their expected price according to 
transaction frequency.  
Time intervals between trades can show diminishing confidence when linked to losses 
and complacency and comfort when linked to profits. Among other methods, we used 
transaction duration [72] using time-interval metrics rather than transaction intensity to 
examine the behavior of traders with regard to loss aversion. The reason for this is that 
the gaps between trades tell a different story to the number of trades a trader makes during 
the trading day. Continuously during the business day, a trader opens a new trade and 
then, when he has closed that trade, follows up by opening another trade at an irregular 












Figure 7 Average Time in Trade in RTDS  
Figure 7 shows that there was a gap between the trades in early part of the day but the throughout 
the trading day the trader reduced the time in trades significantly. The Y-Axis is the time in 
Billionths of seconds, so the scale reads 5, 10, 15 and 20 seconds effectively. The objective of 
using billionths of seconds is to create a very granular observation of the data.  
 
The degree to which a trader is successful is often observed in the length of the time 
interval between placing a winning or losing trade and the next follow-up trade. If the 
trader is profitable and confident of future success, his trades tend to be closer together in 
time, whereas if he is loss making and less confident of future success the trades tend to 
be further apart. This has implications for risk management. Observations in the research 
have shown that study of the following characteristics provides insight into trader’s levels 
of confidence.  
 Frequency of placing orders 
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 Frequency of pulling orders 
 Time interval taken to accept a loss 
 Time interval taken to accept a profit 
 Use of stop loss orders 
 Reaction time to sharp market movement 
 Reaction time to slow market movement 
 
Time-based metrics, then, provide evidence of trading confidence with the rate of orders 
and trades that follow each other. If the time between trades diminishes and the trader is 
profitable then their behaviour shows confidence. If the time in trade metric shows a 
steadily increasing measure during loss making for example, this is not such good trading 
behaviour and shows the trader is holding onto losses for too long.  
 
3.2.1.4 Confidence metrics 
 
The time-based metrics link in with the confidence metrics. The positive and negative 
drift metrics show how well the trader is maximizing trading opportunity. The metric 
measures the profitability of each individual trade and when the trade is closed for a profit 
or a loss it then calculates the difference between the trade outcome and the subsequent 
movement in the price of the trade instrument. For example, if the trader buys an oil future 
with a price of 45.03 and sells that future for 45.07, the trade would normally be 
considered as a success. However, if, once the trade is closed at 45.07 the price of the oil 
future rises to 45.15 in a given time period the positive drift is the difference between the 
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traded price of 45.07 and the subsequent higher price of 45.15 showing a potential further 
profit was missed. The drift metrics provide evidence of selling winners too early and 
closing losing trades too late, the key determinant of the Disposition Effect.  
Rapid trade frequency suggests more extreme behaviour, perhaps with the need to recover 
a loss or the need to capitalize on a profitable situation. Low trade frequency suggests 
lower levels of confidence, less opportunistic trading environment or loss of confidence. 
Change in time-interval metrics, that is, between actions, denotes a change in behavior. 
3.2.1.5 Summary 
 
The capabilities of RTDS enable the researcher to observe the critical point activity of the 
trader ‘in flight’ which then promotes the opportunity for a link between the trader and 
assistive machines that can intervene in the trader’s realtime trading activity in a set 
trading time horizon of one day, being the start and the end of the trading session [42]. 
The potential for this assistive and interventionist technology to positively modify the 
trading behaviour of the human trader in realtime opens up new fields of study in human-
machine interaction as well as providing a basis for rethinking the structure of the markets 
and the products that are traded. This thesis looks to open up the potential for many new 
areas of activity and to provide the basis for further research in this area.    
 
 
3.3 Trading Workflow 
 
In order to create new models for assessing realtime trader behaviour it is important to 
understand the trader’s workflow. Traders workflow can be described as follows: traders 
have limited decisions to make: buy, add to open trades, sell, do nothing. The skill in 
determining profitable outcomes is in deciding when to make a trade. Decision-making 
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processes are ruled by the alignment of certain clues as to when timing the trading 
decision becomes optimal. As can be seen in Chapter 5, the new behavioural 
interventionist model employs a Bayesian causality model [73] in order to support this.  
  The trader’s objective is to reduce the number of clues that they rely on so as to make 
the job of arriving at a profitable trading decision less burdensome on working memory. 
Successful traders often use a process of Progressive Reasoning [74] rather than 
deliberate assessment of risky choices. Traders know they are taking risks but the risks 
are not in the forefront of their minds at all times. Instead, the tasks represent everyday 
work to them so that deeper reasoning is not performed as it is too time consuming. 
Instead, deeper reasoning occurs when choices become difficult to determine for a 
particular outcome. Profit or loss outcomes are unknown at the instigation of the trade 
and the objective is not to hold the open position for too long but to take single or multiple-
tick regular profits. Risk is their business so it would seem natural to expect their attitude 
to risk to be different from the average person whose natural inclination is to try and avoid 
risk. It could be construed then that professional traders treat risk in a different way. As 
their livelihood is directly linked to their trading performance it is important that traders 
are actively trading and maintaining open positions, either short or long, that enable them 
to risk for profit. Outcomes are unknown at the instigation of the trade so that the trader 
applies an approximation of likely outcomes. The objective is to provide a number of 
experiments that test the augmentation opportunities for enhancing trader decision-
making success based on these assumptions. Traders trading one or more financial 
instruments via a computer linked to an electronic transaction facility (exchange or MTF) 
have a set group of responses to market conditions in the form of set order types and a 
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typical GUI. Trading from the GUI via the exchange interface, data transportation 
message protocols, like FIX Protocol, transmit actions generated by the trader from his 
computer in the following accepted formats: 
 
 Buy order  
 Sell order 
 Cancel Order 
 Replace order 
 Limit order 
 Immediate or cancel order 
 Good Until cancelled 
Within these activity constraints lies a huge number of behavioural responses in the form 
of the implementation of trading strategies. Trading strategies that rely on the deployment 
of these actions fall into the following categories: 
 Scalping 
 Short bias/Long Bias 
 Momentum trading 
 Position taking 
 Short 
 Long 






3.3.1 Matching open positions with corresponding closing trades 
 
One of the challenges identified in this thesis early in the research was that it is difficult 
to match open and closed orders, particularly because the shapes of orders and fills can 
be different and they can be partially closed at irregular intervals. For example, if a trader 
is trading in 25 futures and receives a partial fill for 10 futures with 15 remaining to be 
traded, if he then opens a new order to buy 25 futures, which original order do subsequent 
closing trades fill? The first or the second? It was discovered that it is possible to match 
the order numbers with the traded quantities which makes it a lot easier to identify 
completed trades where one open position is closed by another. Futures trading is unique 
in financial markets in that every new order that results in a trade is deemed to be an 
‘open’ trade, but trades that reduce an open position to zero are deemed to be ‘closing 
trades’although not specifically labelled as such by the trading system. What made order 
and trade identification easier is that each order has a unique identifier from its inception 
at the trader’s computer and then a unique trade identifier at the exchange when it is 
transacted. It was found that if a trade is split into several different sized ‘shapes’ when it 
is transacted, each shape has an identical number. So for example, the trade below, which 
was an initial order for 25 contracts, was filled in six ‘shapes’ at the exchange. Each shape 













Identifier Action Verb Volume Contract 
 03XV5TNS4 Fill Sell 3 SPH5 
Trade1 03XV5TNS4 Fill Sell 2 SPH5 
 03XV5TNS4 Fill Sell 1 SPH5 
 03XV5TNS4 Fill Sell 1 SPH5 
 03XV5TNS4 Fill Sell 1 SPH5 
 03XV5TNS4 Fill Sell 1 SPH5 
 03XV5TNS4 Fill Sell 6 SPH5 
 03XV5TNS4 Fill Sell 3 SPH5 
 03XV5TNS4 Fill Sell 7 SPH5 
Trade 2 03XV5TO7G Fill Buy 25 SPH5 
 03XV5TG65 Fill Sell 17 SPH5 
Trade 3 03XV5TG65 Fill Sell 5 SPH5 
 03XV5TG65 Fill Sell 1 SPH5 
 03XV5TG65 Fill Sell 2 SPH5 
 03XV5THY7 Fill Buy 4 SPH5 
 03XV5THY7 Fill Buy 2 SPH5 
Trade 4 03XV5THY7 Fill Buy 5 SPH5 
 03XV5THY7 Fill Buy 1 SPH5 
 03XV5THY7 Fill Buy 10 SPH5 
 03XV5THY7 Fill Buy 3 SPH5 
 
Table 2 Exchange Identifier in the Trading Data  
Table 2 shows the detail of the trader’s trade audit trail and the exchange identifier for each 
subset of an individual transaction. The reason that a single trade can have multiple ‘fills’ is that 
there is seldom a matching order of the same size on the opposite side of the trader’s original 
order to complete a transaction. The exchange’s matching engine apportions available orders of 
various sizes to fill the trader’s order.    
 
 
Another characteristic of this type of trading is that traders seek to establish a flat position 
at the end of each trade. For example, they may send an order to buy 25 contracts which 
is filled at the exchange. Then they seek to make a profit by closing that position by way 
of a sale of 25 contracts which then brings their open position back to zero. With the order 
and trade identifiers we know the size of the trader’s previous order as well as his current 
open position, and can then match the open position to the closing transaction. As we can 
see from the data in Table 2 that there are distinct buy and sell transactions with unique 
identifiers. Each transaction (Trade 1-4) is for a total of 25 contracts and after each 
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Work has been accomplished in realtime behavioural models linked to risk and market 
regulation [2] but to date, there are no known behavioural models for capturing and 
assessing the realtime trading behaviour of Low Frequency Traders (LFTs) that then leads 
to the potential intervention of realtime augmentative tools. Chapter 5 describes the 
opportunity for creating such a model. Models, in general, play a large part in economic 
risky decision sciences. By introducing methods and means to capture, interpret and study 
realtime trading activity this thesis expects to form the basis for a new behavioural model 
application for realtime risk assessment of human critical point activities. The approach 
and results can be translated into a wider observation of human-machine interaction in 
risky environments.  
The change in traded markets, whereby speed and HFT algorithmic trading activity has 
become ubiquitous and extreme, has caused interpretations of traditional classic economic 
risky decision-making to be enhanced. Now with a rich data set that can used to study 
trader’s behavior in greater granularity, new opinions can be formed. Van Dujin [75] 
believes that “Unveiling the processes of higher cognitive functions, such as economical 
decision-making, is particularly challenging because the flow of input information is 
rarely under experimental control. As a result, the input/output function is vague and 
mechanistic decision theories remain unconstrained and hardly testable.” With the 
73 
 
availability of ‘microscopic’ individual trader data, as described in this thesis, we can 
overcome these difficulties.  
  
The first objective is to see if the findings of traditional literature hold true with regard to 
loss aversion. Whereby laboratory experiments and uninformed non-expert subjects have 
been used to make valuable findings that can be applied on a broad scale, this thesis 
continues and extends the current push to use the richer data sets in order to examine 
financial experts in situ. One objective of the research is to determine if expert traders 
follow the same heuristic patterns and biases with regard to risk and loss aversion that 
non-expert experiment subjects do and to compare the results from the research with those 
of traditional literature. The opportunity then is to adopt the expert-performance 
approach [56].  This approach examines expert performance under ecologically valid 
conditions that are representative of the domain of expertise rather than in a laboratory 
whereupon it is not possible to extrapolate processes or mechanisms of naïve and 
unskilled participants to experts with extended instruction, knowledge, experience and 
practice. This leads to the potential positive modification of trading behaviour. By being 
able to accurately understand realtime decision-making through trader’s behaviour we 
can begin to study new areas of application like the implications of immediate feedback 
on risky decision-making, the impact of trader activity on market ethics, market 
microstructure design and human-machine collaboration. The results of the trading 
experiments and the use of RTDS provide a basis for future study of human critical point 
activity with regard to risky-decision making at the realtime edge. New models formed 
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from the results and processes used can also form the basic design-architecture for the 
































Chapter 4 describes the experiments undertaken in the research. With the introduction of 
realtime trader analysis a new behavioural model with new data analysis tools we can 
look at three classic economical decision-making theories and see if, at high frequency, 
the same biases exist. We can then look to modify these instances of bias using new tools 





In this Chapter we look at the structure of the trading experiments and their results in the 
light of classic theories of behavioural finance with reference to risk taking. Having 
created the tools and assessment measures to more fully understand the LFTs trading audit 
trail through the use of RTDS, we can now move forward to a different level of 
interpretation. Loss aversion is our starting point. To summarize, traditionally theory 
suggests that losses loom larger than profits [14] and people prefer to take profits quickly 
and let losses run. The behavioral implications of loss aversion are that a gain cannot 
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compensate for a loss of equal absolute magnitude (an even gamble to win or lose some 
amount should be rejected, for example). These biases with regard to loss aversion extend 
to trading. Comparisons between expert traders and non-experts with regard to 
similarities or differences in the phenomenon of loss aversion have already been 
undertaken. In addition, those that fail to adapt to losses or to attain an expected gain 
induce risk seeking [16]. This may lead people to make decisions that maximize neither 
their wealth nor their happiness [76]. According to [77], loss aversion is an auxiliary 
principle introduced ad hoc to account for seemingly anomalous phenomena while [78] 
found that for small outcomes gains loom larger than losses. In addition, a point that is 
relevant to LFTs is that people might, however, learn that losses have less emotional 
impact than they predicted if they have the opportunity to experience repeated losses in 
the same domain over a short period of time [79] [80]. In addition, people believe that 
losses will have more impact than gains because they fail to anticipate how easily they 
will cope with losses. However, experienced LFTs are often more hardened to loss in 
short-term trading, viewing them as a cost of doing business, which suggests that losses 
and profits are accepted with equal disdain thus making the trader indifferent to either. 
By accepting that losses are a cost of doing business expert traders are engaging in 
business by being risk seeking while loss aware. Traders actively avoid loss but 
simultaneously adopt trading behavior that is commensurate with aggressively seeking 
profits. That is, they adopt aggressive risk taking strategies, that actively seek to acquire 
gains: they risk for profit while actively managing loss. 
  While providing a firm basis for understanding the behavioural traits of risky-choices, 
the traditional and current literature may not describe the true intricacies of the situation 
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as far as the LFT is concerned, especially at the realtime edge. In fact, the findings 
supporting this thesis suggest that successful traders attempt to adopt a behavioral 
approach that reflects the concavity of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) [81] in its 
mathematical certainty in that consistently profitable trading is very much a function of a 
repeat success scenario [47] in that expert traders seek to repeat successful behavior as 
perfectly as possible in market scenarios that they recognize and have traded successfully 
before. During such situations the trader is adopting what could be described as a 
normative model of rational choice in that he is adopting the three tenets of EUT namely 
Expectation, Asset Integration and Risk Aversion, [16] in the fact that the overall utility 
of the prospect is the expected utility of its outcomes, Asset Integration in that the trader’s 
wealth is enhanced through successful trading, and Risk Aversion in that the trader prefers 
a certain outcome to any risky prospect with an expected positive result.  Expert trading 
behavior seeks to establish axiomatic responses upon which to act in definable individual, 
and repetitive, trading scenarios, even if the success of those axiomatic responses are only 
partially proved and, instead, form statistical likelihoods or high probabilities. As their 
livelihood is directly linked to their trading performance traders need to be engaged in 
their activities by maintaining open positions, either short or long, that enable them to risk 
for profit. This is evident in the research undertaken in that less experienced traders in the 
group were inactive while being in loss and more active when in profit while experienced 
traders were actively trading while in loss and less when in profit.  If traders utilize an 
approach where they expect to make losses at least part of the time this differs with regard 
to EUT in that profits are always sought by the trader but loss is expected. Because they 
constantly entertain both outcomes they do not experience risk or loss aversion in the 
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same way as is depicted in traditional behavioural finance research. They employ a 
reduced probability expectation for each single trade (they know they can do many trades 
so they are not overly worried about taking risks with single trades and they have less 
edge. They can always go back to the table if they lose) with marginal utility, in that they 
have a degree of disengagement from the task of trading as they are very accustomed to 
it. As traders become more profitable they tend to become more risk averse first seen in 
[42] and also in the research experiments described in this thesis. The tendency is for 
traders to be mostly conservative and biased towards the status quo. Loss aversion triggers 
status quo bias [31]; that is, not wanting to lose what one has already made. In cases where 
under-reaction occurs, investors who have been positively inclined towards a certain 
investment may continue to buy the asset even though a weight of negative information 
is accumulating. This offers attractive trading opportunities for traders who take the 
contrarian view of asset price movements. The expectation is that as soon as the weight 
of negative information becomes too heavy to ignore, the asset price will reverse strongly 
as investors overreact by selling strongly. As people have a tendency to be more loss 
averse than profit seeking, [17] it follows that they are likely to overreact by selling the 
asset too vigorously in order to avoid losses. The herding instinct is prevalent when the 
weight of negative or positive information available to traders creates a market-fulfilling 
prophecy. LFTs experience the phenomenon of under and overreaction in markets and, if 
they are unaware of the basis for the extreme moves, can be badly caught out. Hilton [35] 
uses the example where people were asked to judge from memory how many fouls were 
committed during a football match. One set of spectators was asked to review from 
memory the entire match, while the others were asked to review each half of the game 
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and then to add the two together. The research found that those that added the number of 
fouls in each half tended to exceed the number estimated by those that were asked to 
estimate for the whole.  LFTs who base their decision-making processes on memories of 
past events may find that, in reality, those events are exaggerated or not according to how 
they are framed. It is evident from the research conducted by [35] and others that there is 
much still to learn in trader psychology. There are so many intangibles that affect trader 
behavior that there is a need to be able to clearly identify when certain trading “Sins” [35] 
are being committed. The behavioral implications of loss aversion are that a gain cannot 
compensate for a loss of equal absolute magnitude. These opinions with regard to loss 
aversion extend to trading. [42] work with futures traders from the CBOT with traders 
appearing to be highly loss-averse, regularly assuming above-average afternoon risk to 
recover from morning losses.  
  In a different way, the Disposition Effect [17] is the observation that investors tend to 
realize gains more than losses. A standard explanation of the Disposition Effect refers to 
prospect theory [16] and, in particular, to asymmetric risk aversion according to which 
investors are risk-averse when faced with gains and risk-seeking when faced with losses. 
However, [82] show that for reasonable parameter values, the disposition effect cannot, 
however, be explained by prospect theory. The reason is that those investors who sell 
winning stocks and hold losing assets would not have invested in stocks in the first place. 
That is, the standard prospect theory argument is sound ex-post, assuming that the 
investment occurred, but not ex-ante, requiring also that the investment has to be made in 
the first place. [42] show the existence of the Disposition Effect in the futures market with 
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traders appearing to be highly loss-averse, regularly assuming above-average afternoon 
risk to recover from morning losses. 
 
While, some years ago, the social atmosphere of open outcry trading pits made decision-
making confirmation more readily available to futures and stock traders, in electronic 
markets traders do not necessarily have exposure to the confirming viewpoints of others. 
Historically, successful traders have tended to work alone exemplifying strong 
dependence on their own opinions rather than seeking the approval of others. The aim of 
the experiments was to confront the LFTs with a different working environment that 
encouraged them to collaborate with each other first, and then, ultimately, with a machine. 
Trading electronically assists the trader in relying on his own analysis and opinions and 
because of the isolated and intense nature of the undertaking, traders are normally 
engrossed with their own trading activity on their own computer monitor screen while 
mostly unaware of the actions of those sitting around them. The experiments sought to 
turn this notion on its head by introducing other traders into the personal workspace of 
LFTs with the intent of seeing how well they began to collaborate in groups and influence 
each other. For example, each of the groups of six traders on the pods of six linked desks 
were encouraged to talk about their trading ideas and to move freely around to talk to 
each other. The effect of this collaboration can be seen in Table 4 with the reduction in 
the standard deviation of profitability between individual, group and machine 
experiments. It can be seen that traders were less likely to be risky when working in 




With regard to electronic trading, illusion of control and optimism bias can have the effect 
of making traders overtrade. Encouraged by the illusion of control that some traders 
experience, they fall prey to unsubstantiated optimism that leads them to make more 
trades than they would normally do on average even when they are losing.LFTs were 
under observation for evidence of this bias in group and machine-led settings as well as 
in individual trading sessions. As can be seen in Table 4, the average number of trades of 
combined groups of LFTs fell when the traders moved from trading individually to 
trading in groups and then marginally again when trading with the BIT which suggests 
that traders were unlikely to over trade when in groups or trading with machines, while 
overtrading is a hallmark of optimism bias. Although statistically some of these trades 
will be successful, the overall effect of optimism bias on the trader’s portfolio is to 
increase risk without the greater certainty of positive outcomes. Subsequent losses can 
have a damaging effect on a trader’s morale and confidence if he truly believes that, 
unaware of his unsubstantiated optimism, he should have the upper hand. In addition to 
optimism bias, traders in electronic markets often have difficulty in identifying what 
information they should be paying attention to because there is so much of it. The 
lucrative business of selling information has created a realtime and historic mass of 
uncorrelated data that needs to be constantly sorted by software programs so that it should 
be ordered enough to make a modicum of sense to the trader.  The “noise” inherent in 
market data and financial news is significant and traders can be fazed by the prospect of 
making trading decisions based upon them. The ease with which information can be 
grouped together and collaborated means that traders often make illusory correlations 
[35]. However, a popular strategy that LFTs use to determine the likely outcome of the 
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anticipated price movements of financial instruments is to correlate them against other 
instruments. By buying and selling two financial instruments simultaneously so that the 
trader is long of one and short of another referred to as spread trading, traders expect to 
see the spread differential widen or narrow in the prices of the two instruments thus 
providing an opportunity to profit. Spreading is a popular trading strategy and can be 
undertaken in several ways. With futures, traders can buy and sell the same financial 
instrument but with different expiry cycles, they can spread related products against each 
other, for example, buying a 10-year Treasury Future and selling a 30-year long bond 
future, or they can spread seemingly unrelated products like equity index futures and 
short-term interest rate futures. Now that the same product is often listed by multiple 
exchanges, inter-market spreads are becoming very popular as a short term trading 
opportunity. The notion that underpins spread trading is that there is a recognizable 
positive or negative correlation between the products being traded and that relative 
movements in their prices can be tracked and anticipated with some degree of accuracy 
 
In summary, the behavioral implications of Loss Aversion are that a gain cannot 
compensate for a loss of equal absolute magnitude and that the objective is to see if the 
same biases appear in the experiments undertaken in the realtime trading activity of LFTs. 
The data captured by RTDS provides a very clear observation of the behavioural 
characteristics of individual traders, groups of traders and the impact of introducing 
experimental BITs. The categories of metrics provide a means to be able to compare 
different behavioural traits in traders from a base level to a more sophisticated level. As 
can be seen from the outcome of the experiments, observations of the trading behaviour 




4.2 Experiment design 
 
The study group for this thesis comprises 32 LFT day traders trading in E-Mini S&P 500 
futures™ traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). There is a mix of trading 
experience amongst the group. They use a computer mouse to click trade in the exchange 
central limit order book (CLOB) rather than to automate their trading in an algorithm. 
The experiments took place over six weeks and involved several sessions all trading the 
same futures product. As mentioned in Chapter 1 traders performed, on average, up to 
five trading sessions of two hours at minimum each over the six-week experimental 
period. Many of the traders in the experiments are self-employed but under the risk and 
clearing control of an established trading company. They risk the trading company’s 
money in order to attempt to make profits and share a proportion of their winnings with 
the trading company. The professional trader’s income is derived from trading individual 
futures contracts in realtime using proprietary trading software. Operating as day traders, 
(that is trading within a set time period, referred to as ‘exchange hours’, dictated by the 
opening and closing time of the exchange that lists the products they trade), they buy and 
sell single or multiple E-Mini S&P 500 futures™ continuously throughout the day when 
the opportunity for profit presents itself. Their objective is to observe the price 
fluctuations of the futures through a Graphical User Interface (GUI) linked to the CME 
CLOB and trade matching engine and to take short-term long or short open positions 
through manual order entry by way of a computer mouse or a keyboard, in order to 
capitalize on favourable price movements in the fluctuating price movement of the 
instrument. LFTs actively place orders in the market so as to provide themselves with the 
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potential for profit. They operate within a set time period during the trading session and 
begin the trading day with a flat book and end the same trading day with a flat book. That 
is, they start with zero open positions and end the day with zero open positions. They are 
then left with a net loss or a net profit depending on the overall return from their trades. 
They do not, as a rule, carry open trades from one exchange trading day over to another. 
This, in itself presents a useful research opportunity because the research period neatly 
fits into a single time period within which the first opening trade and the last closing trade 
of the day forming a closed set of trades. In addition, by trading the same financial 
instrument, in this case the E-Mini S&P 500 futures™, traders can be compared during 
the same market conditions and the same time intervals. During the hours that they are 
trading they monitor the realtime changes in the price of the trading instrument and gauge 
when to buy or sell in order to take advantage of movements in the price of the instrument. 
LFTs are placing orders to execute trades throughout the trading day. Their overall 
objective is to spot opportunities to go long or short with a new opening position and then 
to profit from a fall or rise in the price of the instrument before closing the open position 
hopefully at a profit. The skill of the LFT is to determine the most advantageous time to 
open a new trade and the equally best time to close it given the market price fluctuations 
in the instrument. The main point is that the trader is not encouraged to hold a lengthy 
trading position unless it is moving in a distinctly profitable direction for a long period of 
time, but to engage in ‘short-termism’ by opening and closing trades in quick succession. 
This is commonly referred to in the industry as scalping. The trader’s objective is to take 
as many short-term profits as possible and to minimise the prospect of losses by closing 
losing trades quickly.  
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  Traders open new trades through filled orders and then, when they have closed the trade, 
follow up by opening a new trade at various timescales. A significant drawback to the 
analysis of historical data without automated tools, occurs when particular segments or 
snapshots of trading activity cannot be accurately linked to the market scenarios to which 
they belong so that any assessment work that does not map the actual millisecond by 
millisecond market event to the associated trading activity is flawed from the start.  
 
4.2.1 The trading room environment 
 
The environment in which a trader trades can have an impact on their trading behaviour 
[83]. The experiment trading room was designed to provide all the amenities and tools 
that an LFT would normally expect to use. Each LFT was allocated a trading desk with a 
wide-screen computer that hosted the trading front-end order entry and trade management 
systems and provided access to charts and news information. The LFTs were spaced 
approximately three feet apart and were split into groups of six and seated around a six-
desk oval design. The objective was to make the trading room more congenial than a 
traditional computer lab with bench-style table design set out in rows. As soon as LFTs 
entered the room and took their seats they were already beginning to feel more associated 
with their peers. This was an important objective because one of the objectives of the 
experiments was to measure the ways in which LFTs would communicate and 
collaborate. Some of the LFTs knew each other while others knew no-one present in the 
room. Once the LFTs had taken their seats, switched on their trading software and 
established their GUI set-up they were briefed that they were going to trade for up to three 
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periods during the trading day each of around two hours, and at each new period they 
would be experiencing a change in set-up.  
1. Period 1 required the LFTs to trade on their own. 
2. Period 2 required them to collaborate with each other in sharing trade ideas 
and opportunities 
3. Period 3 introduced the behavioural interventionist trading tool (BIT) as a 
component of the trading set up for each trader 
While many traders in financial markets tend to trade on their own, the objective of these 
experiments was to introduce LFTs to a collaborative and synergistic trading environment 
in order to see if they behaved differently when in groups or linked to a machine. The 
three sets of experiments were repeated at intervals over the weeks of the experiment 
duration and the results were compared to the three areas of classic decision-risk 
economics using realtime trading scenarios in order to understand the following: 
1. Do LFTs suffer from the behavioural biases and heuristics described in the 
theories of loss aversion, disposition effect and overconfidence? 
2. Do any of these biases change when  
i. They trade as part of a group in a collaborative form 
ii. They trade in the knowledge that they are being overseen by an 
interventionist tool that is designed to assist and augment their 
trading behaviour and activity? 
3. Do LFTs improve their trading activity, profit and loss and risk position when 
i. They trade as part of a group in a collaborative manner 
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ii. They trade in the knowledge that they are being overseen by an 
interventionist tool that is designed to assist and augment their 
trading behaviour and activity?  
 
4.2.2 Behavioural interventionist tools (BITs) 
 
An interactive tool that reads human trader’s decision-making responses to realtime 
market conditions, reacts to those market conditions and formulates a response whereby 
it intervenes positively in a trader’s realtime trading activity does not currently exist in 
commercial form but it does in experimental form. A prototype BIT was created to work 
with individual traders and utilized the sample set of metrics provided by RTDS as a basis 
for its activity. Some examples of the BIT activity relative to the trader’s profitability are 
described later in the chapter. Following the results of these experiments, a full-
production model of the BIT is now in preparation. Using newly formed constructs and 
design series (explained in Chapter 5) the tools are being created with the use of models 
that involve artificial-intelligence. The objective of the experiments was to prepare the 
groundwork for such machines by observing what happens when LFTs believe they are 
interacting with them on a realtime basis. If such a tool did exist would it have a positive 
effect on the trading behaviour of LFTs? Then, if results were positive, to propose 
constructs and models for the creation of such tools. Using the trading behavioural model 
described in Chapter 5, the results from the experiments can be used to create the basis 
for forming human-machine collaboration in that there are clearly identifiable strengths 
and weaknesses in a trader’s behaviour that can be positively modified, or augmented, or 
blocked. The experiments, therefore, were designed very carefully to give the participants 
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the impression that these behavioural interventionist tools (BITs) did exist, were being 
used in the experiment, and were successfully intervening in their trading activity. They 
did not see the tool as it was ‘hidden’ on a separate computer away from the trading 
computers. However, the outcome of the tool’s ‘observations’ were sent via messaging 
software to the desktop of the trader. The result was the LFTs acted upon the belief that 
their trading behaviour was being observed, analysed and potentially improved by the 
BIT.  
  As highlighted, the LFTs concentrated their trading efforts in one financial futures 
instrument during the same time period and in the same market. The idea was not to give 
the traders too many choices regarding the instruments to trade as this would have made 
decision-making collaboration difficult if they were trading in different instruments. This 
approach is consistent with the findings of [84] in that the most successful day traders 
tend to concentrate their efforts on a small number of instruments for which they can 
develop an expertise in anticipating news information and its effect on prices.  
 
4.2.3 The null hypothesis 
 
  The null hypothesis states that there will be no change to the LFTs trading behaviour 
when grouped with colleagues or linked to a performance-enhancing BITs and that there 
will be no statistical significance to the findings. The expectation was that there would be 
no statistical significance observed in the behavioural metrics which were applied to the 
trader’s behaviour, whether the trader was trading as an individual, as part of a group or 
working with a BIT. Statistical significance ranges of 10%, 5% and 1% were applied 
through a t-test as shown in Table 3. Nine metrics were selected to provide the basis for 
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the assessment of the trader’s trading activity. The table below identifies these nine 
metrics and the Alternative Hypothesis.   
 









There is a reduction in the number of consecutive losers 
Number of 
scratches 
There is a reduction in the number of scratches  
Average trade 
size 




There is a decrease in average time between trades 
Average time in 
a trade (sec) 
There is an increase in the average time in trades 
Maximum 
positive drift 
There is a reduction in max positive drift 
Maximum 
negative drift 
There is a reduction in negative drift 
Ratio of winners 
to losers 
There is an Improvement in the number of winning 
versus losing trades 
 
Table 3 The Alternative Hypothesis 
 
The Alternative hypothesis in Table 3 shows the expectation for the alternative result from the 
experiments over the null hypothesis. Using the metrics as a guide, the table lists the observations 
that would support the alternative hypothesis.  
 
In line with traditional theories of behavioural finance as discussed in Chapter 2, the null 
hypothesis suggests we should not expect to see any change in the trader’s behavioural 
responses to trading scenarios trading either as an individual, in a group or with the 
support of a BIT. In relation to the Disposition effect and Loss aversion and 





The Disposition Effect 
1. Traders would not form a comfort level with profits or losses beyond which 
they would become risk averse (with profits) and risk seeking (with losses) 
2. When the groups and machines were introduced the incidence of disposition 
effect would not change.  
Loss Version and Overconfidence 
3. When the groups and BITs were introduced the incidence of loss aversion 
would not improve and that there would be no change to the variance in 
losses, the degree of inter-transactional intervals or to the volume of trades  
4. Overconfidence as seen in the incidence of over trading would not change 
5. The ratio of time in winners to time in losers would not improve and the 




Once the data had been collected for all the experiments from RTDS and had been 
analysed, a set of descriptive statistics was created, the details of which are seen here in 














10.1 15.59 16.67 
SD Profit 49.09 32.62 34.97 
Max Profit 100.5 97 80.35 
(Min 
Profit) 
(72.5) (42.75) (33.75) 




28 19 22 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics based on Trader Profitability 
 
The Descriptive Statistics show a range of data for individual, group and machine-based 
trading. Mean, Standard Deviation, maximum and minimum winning or losing trades, the 
skewness and the number of trades are included. Mean profitability was recorded in US$ 
as the trading instrument that was use, the S+P500 Index Future, is denominated in US$.  
 
  
The observations from these statistics show a number of useful findings: 
 
1. Although profitability was low across all experiments due to a broad mix of traders 
who made losses and profits, the mean improved between Individual, Group and 
Machine. The rate of improvement was not substantial but it was positive.  
2. The average number of trades dropped significantly in the Group statistics compared 
to the Individual statistics and then recovered again slightly in the Machine statistics. 
This may have been due to a number of factors including the fact that trading in 
groups was a new experience for many of the traders and they were less willing to 
risk themselves in front of their peers. This observation was confirmed when the rate 
of trades increased as the LFTs moved onto the Machine led experiments from the 
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Groups suggested that the lack of peer group observation made them more confident 
to risk themselves again.  
3. Maximum and minimum profitability dropped from Individual, to Group to Machine. 
This indicated the adoption of a more cautious approach to risk as the LFTs started to 
work in groups or with the BIT.  
4. The Standard Deviation reduced as the LFTs worked together and with the BITs 
which also suggested that a lower risk approach was being taken. This also fits in 
with the lower number of trades with the group and machine options.   
4.3.1 Direction of change – descriptive statistics 
 
Direction of Change- Positive 
1. Mean profitability increased – the degree of profitability increased over the 
experimental period when LFTs moved from trading as individuals and were 
introduced to group trading sessions and machine trading sessions.  
2. Standard deviation improved – Compared to trading individually, LFTs were less 
risky when trading in groups and with machines, although marginally riskier when 
trading with machines than in groups.  
3. Minimum and maximum profitability reduced – the maximum and minimum 
profitability reduced for winning trades and losing trades on average so that more 
extreme trading losses and profits were seen when traders traded individually,  
Direction of Change- Negative to neutral 
4. The number of trades reduced between Individuals and Groups but improved slightly 
when working with the BIT-  
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Following on from the descriptive statistics, the data from the metrics was assessed in 
relation to the differences between the group trading activities, and a number of 
calculations were made including standard deviation, and t-test in order to show how 
statistically significant the results were. Statistical significance was achieved with a t-test 















 (1.44)  (1.50)  (1.82*) 
Number of 
scratches 
 (3.94***)  (4.13***)  (4.31***) 
Average 
trade size 





 (1.98**)  (2.83***)  (2.79***) 
Average 
time in a 
trade (sec) 












 (0.34)  (1.17)  (1.19) 
 
Table 5 Experiment Results 
 
Results from the trading sessions have been split in this table into three columns showing the 
different results between trading Periods and their variability. The objective is to show that there 






4.3.2 Direction of change – individual-group-machine results 
 
Direction of Change- Positive 
1. Number of Consecutive Winners – the number of consecutive winners improves 
significantly from individual to group to machine, an example of which can be seen 
in the RTDS screen shot in Figure 15 on page 107. This statistic is key to the 
improvement of trader profitability as it suggests that the trader is following winning 
trades with other winning trades.  
2. Average Time Between Trades – Another statistically significant observation as the 
time between trades reduces as traders become more confident of their trading ability 
and profitability.   
3. Maximum Positive Drift – the maximum positive drift statistic improves between 
individual/group and group/machine significantly as the efficiency with which traders 
run winning trades improves. 
4. Maximum Negative Drift – there is a slight improvement in the statistics but running 
losses is still a feature and reflects the mixed ability of the experiment trading group 
of LFTs.   
Direction of Change- Neutral 
5. Ratio of Winners to Losers -  the ratio of winners/losers does not improve 
significantly. However, what does improve is the efficiency with which traders run 
winners so that the improvement in Maximum Positive Drift means that the winners 
are more profitable than the losers are loss making. Even with a similar number of 




The results refuted the null hypothesis and supported the alternative hypothesis in most 
instances as can be seen in Table 4 and 5. What is interesting with regard to the use of 
BITs is that the level of significance confirms the positive response of LFTs to working 
with machines like BITs and forms the basis of Chapter 5.  
 
4.3.1 Data analysis and observations 
 
The data from RDTS was examined during and after the trading activity had finished and 
each individual trader’s activity was transposed into graphic form via Matlab in order to 
establish a visual observation of behaviour. During Period 1 the LFTs actively traded with 
an average of 15 trades per hour. The overall profitability in each subsequent Period 1 
experiment was similar but the frequency of trades undertaken in Period 2 and Period 3 
diminished. The collaboration in Period 2 between groups of traders encouraged a degree 
of thoughtfulness with regard to trading decisions not seen in Period 1 and reduced the 
frequency with which traders entered orders. As a general observation, the LFTs were 
visibly open to working in groups and to allow the BIT to guide them in their trading 
decisions while hypothetically ‘intervening’ in their trading activity. This willingness to 
engage with each other and with the BIT was evident in the overall drop in traded volume 
and not so directly by trading profits. However, the classic behavioural biases observed in 
loss aversion, disposition effect and overconfidence in predictions were reduced as LFTs 
moved from Period 1 to Period 2 and then to Period 3. The following list identifies the 
Figures in this Chapter that correspond with the different experimental periods: 
 Period 1: Figures 7-11,  
 Period 2: Figure 12 
 Period 3: Figures 13-17 
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  4.3.2 Working with the BIT 
 
One of the critical determinants for achieving the goal from the experiments, the basis for 
successful human-machine collaboration, was that immediate feedback was given to 
traders from the BIT. Because the price data coming from the trading system was realtime, 
it was possible to construct a ‘machine decision’ while the LFT reacted to the near to 
realtime data. In addition, some of the initial experiments were conducted when market 
conditions provided evidence of price trends and this helped to demonstrate profitable 
‘machine decisions’ (by suggesting that traders follow the trends) thus reinforcing the 
belief that the BIT was making improvements to LFT’s decisions. LFT’s volume of orders 
dropped, they relaxed more and began to collaborate with ideas for trading strategies in 
Period 3 when the BIT was supposed to be active. The urgency with which individual 
LFTs conducted their isolated trading experiment was not evident in the machine 
experiment.  
4.3.3 Developing the prototype BIT 
In order to see the BIT in action a prototype version was created following the successful 
outcome of the experiments. Although the thesis experiments were conducted without a 
fully-functioning BIT, the results bore evidence of the positive response a trader would 
have to such a machine and a full version was put into construction immediately. The 







4.3.4 RTDS data results 
 
Starting with Figure 8, the graphic denotes the Profit & Loss of the trades undertaken 
during the trading day and shows the time intervals between the closing out of trades and 
the opening up of new ones. As can be clearly seen, the LFT has entered into loss as soon 
as he has started to trade. He continues to trade throughout the day gaining from some 
winning trades but losing from others so that he has a net loss at the end of the day. The 
pattern of his trading as seen in the right graphic, shows that there are short time intervals 
between closing trades and new open trades suggesting that the trader is opening a series 
on trades and holding these open positions for a short period of time before closing them, 












Figure 8 Period 1: Profit and Loss with Durations between Trades: Losing Day 
Figure 8 shows a losing day with a series of small clusters of trades at certain times and short 
intervals between them as the trader tries to recover from the losing situation unsuccessfully. The 
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short length of the intervals between trades and the rapid order entry of several trades in very 
short time intervals suggest that the trader is not following a method but is merely gambling.  
 
As can also be seen in Figure 8 the data provides evidence of responding to extreme loss 
leading to initial flurry of activity and then long lapses between trades. The LFT was not 
risking further loss after an initial attempt to improve the situation but then picked up 
trading activity later in the session to try and reduce losses. The high frequency of trades 
and shorter time duration between trades suggests risk taking. After conditions began to 
improve and profitability increased, the frequency of trading picked up again and led to a 
flurry of trades towards the end of the trading session. A lower frequency of trades with 
longer duration between trades suggests a degree of risk averse behaviour. The trader was 
risk taking as he became more profitable, but became risk averse in losses. It became 
evident as more data was analysed that that LFTs clearly behave differently when in loss 
as denoted by the transaction duration. Trade frequency tends to increase while 
transaction duration is reduced [42]. In Figure 8 there are also small clusters of high 
density trades when the trader is confronted with losing already acquired profits. In an 
effort to recoup losses, the professional trader conducted a high number of short term 
trades with very few seconds duration. However, the losses mounted as the shorter trades 
were unprofitable, then as the trader was making further losses of -800 he stopped and 
the time between trades increased until he started making more profit. This is not typical 
of what happens when the non-sophisticated trader’s trades.  
  Do LFTs risk the losses and the profits rather than just the losses? It has long been 
believed that traders should see trading losses as the cost of doing business in that losing 
in trading happens as frequently as winning and should, as a result, be expected. By 
adopting an attitude to risk for profit traders are able to be opportunistically profit seeking 
99 
 
while actively managing loss. Evidence from the experiments shows that LFTs do not 
risk profits. Loss aversion also triggers status quo bias [31] whereby people tend not to 
want to lose what they already have. However, when the LFT is trading his objective is 
to gain additional profit, an open ended objective, and not to settle for the status quo. In 
this regards, the LFT has an in-built bias to challenge the status quo. 
4.3.3 Trade density 
 
It is a central view in this thesis that LFTs demonstrate, through time intervals between 
placing their trades, an increase or decrease in confidence and in their attitude to risk 
taking. In addition, it is also suggested that the density of trades has an outcome on risky 
decision-making. As keen be seen in Figure 9, taking an individual trader from the group, 
the trade density intensifies during the periods of higher profitability. This suggests that 
the trader is risking for profits. During loss making time periods the traders trade duration 










Figure 9 Period 1: Profit and Loss with Durations between trades, Winning Day 
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In Figure 9 the featured trader shows he is ‘risking for profits’ as the cluster of short term trades 
and the short time intervals between trades suggests greater confidence and profitability.   
 
Figure 9, in comparison to Figure 8, shows a different type of behaviour during a winning 
day. The time intervals between the closing trades and opening new trades are longer in 
Figure 9. At the peak of his profitability in Figure 9 the trader’s order frequency 
diminished and the time interval between trades widened. The LFT in Figure 8 was more 
active in loss making than in periods of profitability which supports loss aversion theory. 
What does this suggest? Firstly, it shows that the LFT is taking less time over his trade 
selection in Figure 8 but is opening and closing trades in quick succession in order to 
attempt to secure regular small profits and to avoid large losses. In Figure 9, the LFT is 
taking more time to select his trades and has longer time intervals between most of his 
trades compared with Figure 8. The rapid opening and closing out of trades in Figure 8 
may point to a lack of confidence in the trader’s ability to pick winning trades and a fear 
of falling further into loss. The longer time intervals between closing out trades and 
opening new ones in Figure 9 may suggest that the trader is deliberately taking his time 
to select profitable trades and to avoid taking unnecessarily risky trades that may result 
in loss. His objective is to preserve profit but to continue to trade with the potential of 
further profit while limiting unnecessary loss. The LFT’s data also shows that when he is 
confident of a trade he increases the size of that trade. Gaps between trades differ 
according to the trader’s profit and loss condition and the state of the market. Rapid order 
(and subsequently trade) follow-up after a losing trade differed than for a winning trade. 
As a result of the research, we find that more experienced LFTs have higher risk 
tolerances and thresholds, are more likely to treat losses and profits in an equal way, as a 












Figure 10 Period 1: Profit and Loss with Duration Between Trades, Losing to Winning Day 
In contrast to Figure 8. Figure 10 shows a longer losing period with a finishing leap in 
profitability. There is a small cluster of short duration trades around 16.00 which suggests that the 
trader is adding to winning positions and building profitability.  
 
In Figure 10 the trader is confronted with a different scenario in that he is trying to move, 
in the early part of the trading day, from a loss to a profit. There is a long period of 
inactivity during the loss making period but as soon as the trader turns profitable, the 
frequency of trades increases and the profitability improves further. There is a visible 
reduction in the time between trades during this period of improved profitability 





















Figure 11 Period 1: Profit and Loss with Duration Between Trades, Winning to Losing Day 
Figure 11 shows a depreciating number of trades and time intervals between trades as the trader 
tries desperately to recover profits and to avoid loss. However, the short lifespan of the trades 
does not suggest confidence in the trader’s positions.  
 
In Figure 11 the scenario is based on an initial winning day then moving into a period of 
loss making. The interesting point here is that the trader has a high frequency of trades 
early in the day and then as losses become more apparent, he reduces the number of trades 
and then attempts to get back into profitability quickly around 12.00 by introducing a 
flurry of trades which prove to be loss-making. This trading behaviour suggests that the 
trader is lacking a plan of action for profitability and, instead, is engaging in gambling 
behaviour, by trying to catch a profitable trade from a large number of orders. As often 
happens, once the loss has been incurred, the inexperienced trader reduces the number of 
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trades for fear of additional losing right up to the oint when he decides to risk again before 
the close of the market. This last minute flurry of trades with very short time intervals 
between them and short lifespans does not prove successful.     
 
The outcome of the data analysis supports [78] the research conclusion in that the traders 
are trading for small outcomes which are incrementally likely to lead to larger profitable 
outcomes. In a series of three experiments, [78] found that for small outcomes, this pattern 
is reversed, and gains loom larger than losses. The reversal was explained on the basis of 
(a) the hedonic principle, which states that individuals are motivated to maximize pleasure 
and to minimize pain, and (b) the assumption that small losses are more easily discounted 
cognitively than large losses are. New thoughts regarding reference points is one area of 
future research. How do LFTs establish a reference point and is this point continuosly 
changing? The trader’s objective is made more difficult because of the short time intervals 
between price movements and changes in market conditions when they are engaged in 
scalping. The fact the prices are constantly changing as well as market conditions 
favouring profit making activity or not, suggests that reference points are also continuosly 
changing, although they may have a proportional relationship to the price movement that 
is independent of the actual price. The influence of reference points on the shape of 
indifference curves has been given a comprehensive treatment by [85]. By Loss aversion, 
they refer to a local distortion in a person's global preference structure, produced by a 
reference, or "status quo" point. Figure 11 which shows the direct overlay of time 
durations between trades and profitability during Period 2 supports the above findings. 
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Time between trades grows longer demonstrating a lower level of confidence in risking 












Figure 12 Period 1: Profit and Loss with Duration between Trades, Winning Day 
In Figure 12 the graph shows that the time between trades increases as the LFTs, trading as 
individuals, become more profitable thus supporting the Disposition Effect and Loss Aversion. As 
the LFT Group becomes more profitable, the time between trades increases showing lower 
confidence in opening new trades.  
 
Figure 12 represents the trading data from all of the LFTs while trading as individuals in 
period 1 during the entire experimental period and without a connection to the BIT. In 
Figure 13, the LFTs are trading in their Groups and then in Figure 14, the BIT is 
introduced. In Figures 12 and 13 the data shows evidence of the traditional Disposition 
Effect and Loss Aversion biases we would expect to see according to our literature review. 
As traders become more profitable they seek to minimize risk and the frequency of new 
opening trades diminishes and profits are taken more quickly in line with risk avoidance 
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irrespective of the market conditions, be they positive or negative. As can be seen from 
Figure 12, the time interval between trades increases as the LFTs, trading individually, become 
more profitable thus supporting the Disposition Effect. As the LFT Groups become more 
profitable in Figure 13, however, the time interval between trades also increases, although not so 













Figure 13 Period 2: Profit and Loss with Duration between Trades, Winning Day 
In Figure 13 the graph shows that the LFT Groups are risk averse when profitability increases as 
identified in the left Y axis. As the LFTs become more profitable, the frequency of trades 
decreases as the time difference between trades increases with lower confidence. However, the 
time differential between trades is not as pronounced as in Figure 11.  
 
 
However, in Figures 14 and 15 during period 3, when the traders were subject to 
observation by the BIT and the BIT was supporting them in their trading decisions, their 
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trading behaviour changed. As the traders became more profitable the shorter the 
durations between trades and the more willing the traders were to risk for profits. This 
activity showed that the traders were encouraged by the support of the BIT and were 














Figure 14 Period 3: Profit and Loss with Duration Between Trades with the BIT, Winning 
Day 
In Figure 14, the graph shows a difference in the LFT’s trading behaviour when the BIT is 
introduced. The time between trades is lower than in Figure 12 and 13 when the LFTs were trading 
as individuals or in groups. With the BIT being introduced, as the LFTs becomes more profitable, 
the time between trades remains the same or decreases slightly, showing greater confidence in 



















Figure 15 Period 3:  Time between Trades and Open Net Positions: Winning Day 
The graph in Figure 15 clearly shows that the LFTs are adding to winning positions with the net 
position, as identified in the right axis, increasing. As the LFTs become more profitable, the 
frequency of trades increases as the time difference diminishes showing greater confidence 
 
Comparing the net open positions with the time difference between trades shows that 
trades were more frequent and the size of trading positions increased. The negative net 
position as shown between the first trade and the 30 following trades denotes short 
positions, the net position being negative. Winning positions shown on the graph from 
trade 30 to 70 were long trades rather than short, so that the net position went positive. At 
times when the traders were experiencing high profitability, the average net positions 
exceeded 20 contracts showing overall high levels of confidence.  
 
In addition, when the BIT was introduced while trading in period 3 the trader’s rate of 
consecutive winners increased as seen in figure 16. There is a distinct increase in the 
incidence of consecutive winners which denotes an increase in confidence and a 
108 
 
willingness to risk more. The rate of consecutive winners also suggest that the trader is 













Figure 16 Period 3: Number of Consecutive Winners  
In Figure 16 the RTDS clearly shows there is an increase in the frequency of the number of 
consecutively winning trades. The Y axis shows the number of consecutive winning trades and 
the X axis shows the time in hours. The higher frequency of consecutive winning trades shows 
the tarder is feeling more confident in his choice of trades.   
 
In Figure 17 it can also be seen that the instance of Maximum Negative Drift has reduced 
during Period 3 with the same trader. This means that the trader was cutting losing trades 


















Figure 17 Period 3: Maximum Negative Drift 
Figure 17 shows an improvement in Maximum Negative drift showing that the trader is seeking 
to reduce risk exposure by cutting losing trades quickly. The Y axis shows the number of price 
ticks and the X axis shows the time in hours. In this instance, the trader is taking no more than 1-
4 ticks loss after 15.00.  
 
In a separate observation, the trader confirms the level of confidence, by increasing the 
flow of orders during Period 3 as seen in Figure 18. This trading behaviour normally 
shows that the trader is in a series of winning positions and is adding to those winning 
trades. The higher the gradient of orders shown in RTDS, the more confident the trader 
appears during a winning day. If, however, he was in a losing day, a steep increase in 

















Figure 18 Period 3: Number of Orders 
As shown in Figure 18, Increases or decreases in the number of generated orders can 
suggest both confidence in winning positions and lack of confidence in losing positions 
so this data has to be viewed alongside winner/loser ratio and the time interval statistics 
for it to have meaning.  
 
4.3.4 Identifying trading frequency within time windows 
 
There are further interesting observations when trader’s activity is broken down into 
regular time slots. It appears that although the early part of the day often sees most 
activity, the range of number of trades and the frequency are not easily slotted into regular 
time windows. As can be seen from Table 6, the trade size and frequency appears to be 
randomly distributed with several time gaps between the trades. a) Trading activity is 
more concentrated during busy times in the market so early in the trading day in the first 




Number of Trades Time window (approx. 
10 Minutes) 
Gaps in trading activity 
30 08:58:17 to 09:09:02  
27 09:09:03 and 09:18:45  
GAP  9 minutes 
9 09:27:22 to 09:36:08  
GAP  22 minutes 
7 09:58:26 to 10:00:38  
GAP  21 minutes 
13 10:21:54 to 10:31:23  
   
 
Table 6 Trading Activity in the First Hour and a Half 
 
Number of Trades Gaps in trading activity 
9  
3  




GAP 21 minutes 
13  
 
Table 7 Trading Windows within 30 Minutes  
Table 6 and 7 show the granularity of the data that is provided by RTDS. The trader’s behaviour 
can be mapped down to the millisecond.  
 
As we saw previously from Figure 9 on page 99, around the time periods 9.00am and 
4.30pm there is a distinct clustering of short-term trades that open positions with short 
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time durations between the closing of one position and the opening of another. As the 
LFT becomes more loss making however after 10am, the frequency of new positions 
following on from closed positions reduces and the duration between positions becomes 
wider. This denotes the reluctance on behalf of the trader to take on new risk. Then, during 
the period between 4pm and 5pm when the LFT moves rapidly into profit the gap between 
closing trades and opening new ones becomes much shorter. Then at 4.30pm when the 
LFT has achieved a profit of 400 and 5.30pm, his trade frequency diminishes and the 
length of time between trades expands. This suggests risk aversion and the objective to 
retain profits.  
4.3.5 Recovery Time from Losing Trades 
 
Through observing the activity of the LFTs in RTDS we can see occasions when the 
traders are successful and unsuccessful in recovering from a series of loss making 
positions. This is an interesting phenomenon because it often shows the level of 
experience and efficiency with which the trader trades. The more experience, the more 
efficient traders appear to be with lower numbers of trades, higher winner/loser ratios and 
fewer gaps between trades. They also reduce the Disposition effect by ‘risking for profits’ 
more frequently.  In Figure 9 and Figure 10 on page 101 the traders increase risk exposure 
by reducing time between trades during profitable periods. In Figure 10, the trader is 
struggling to recover from the losses he has made in the middle of the day and increases 
his trades and reduces the time between trades as he loses. Instead of recovering those 
losses, however, his desperate trading activity compounds those losses. Good Recovery 
metrics point towards improved and ultimately successful trading. Traders recover from 
making losses at different times to each other. Some traders treat losses and profits with 
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equal disdain without being fazed by loss making trades, while others see loss making as 
a part of the business and something to expect. However, some traders take loss making 
very personally and their subsequent trading behaviour is adversely influenced by losses. 
The recovery time subsequent to a loss depends largely on the following: 
 
a) The magnitude of the loss and the means with which the trader has to make 
back that loss or not  
b) The number of consecutive losses and the erosion of confidence that may 
ensue 
c) The impact of unexpected loss as opposed to experimental loss (a trader 
may use a strategy to anticipate trading volume by sacrificing a small loss 
in order to locate liquidity) 
d) The impact of deep loss or high profit on stress levels impeding decision 
making processes and whether the trader is more deeply influenced by the 
loss or the profit. (some traders are adversely affected by high levels of 
profit) 
e) The temptation traders have in risking profits as well as losses (traders who 
make large profits sometimes risk those profits as a result of a somewhat 
misguided confidence that they will not lose them and that if they do, they 
are more likely to be able to replace them. This overconfidence arises from 
a misguided attribution of the trader’s skill in succeeding in a certain market 
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condition that is forever changing (what worked profitably a few minutes 





We can see that during each trading period there were changes in trader behaviour. 
Individually LFTs exemplify expected traits and biases reflected in loss aversion, 
disposition effect and overconfidence in predictions. However, in Period 2 when they 
were collaborating and in Period 3 when they believed they were trading with the 
assistance of a BIT, the LFTs were more relaxed and modified their behaviour. By 
undertaking these experiments we have found that by linking LFTs together (something 
they are not used to doing) and by linking them with a realtime machine, they improve 
upon the traditional behavioural biases outlined in the literature in Chapter 2. What can 
we deduce from this? Human traders modify their behaviour if they work collaboratively 
and with a machine. In most cases the LFTs improved performance when they were a) 
linked together, b) collaborated with the BIT. We now move on to Chapter 5 in the light 

















New Tools for Human Traders 
 
 
This Chapter describe design processes, new models and insights into the creation and use of 
realtime behavioural interventionist tools (BITs) which capture and interpret the realtime digital 
audit trail of a human trader with the objective of positively modifying performance. It describes 
methods, tools and concepts that seek to broaden the scope of realtime data analysis of human 
critical point activity through trading leading to a greater participation of human traders  
 
Such tools can be used to gather important performance information into human critical point 
activity and help us to rethink the ways in which we observe traders, how we research them and 




The headlong pursuit of machine-driven exchange-based centralized marketplaces 
benefits a number of market operators including those HFT trading operations in private 
hedge funds, HFT trading companies and the exchanges themselves. There is a history of 
business union between HFT’s and exchanges that has, at times, moved beyond the legal 
(1) and indeed, the ethical standards of the industry. The proliferation of HFT trading has 
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been encouraged by exchanges as they provide substantial order flow by entering a 
proliferation of passive limit orders which directly add to short-term exchange liquidity. 
In return for their liquidity, exchanges have returned the favour by providing bespoke 
order types that give HFTs a winning advantage at the top of the central limit order book 
(CLOB). Such order types include Spam and Cancel, Hide and Light, and queue jumping 
and give HFTs top-of-the-order book advantage. This means that inevitably, the trading 
success of LFTs who do not have access to the exchange’s bespoke order types, are easy 
prey for the HFTs and form the majority of the group that the HFTs target. This situation 
is unethical and self-interested on the part of the HFTs and the for-profit exchanges and 
does not provide a marketplace that encourages the participation of LFTs. While things 
continue in this way and financial regulators fail to intervene, LFTs have no protection 
against privileged order trading activity at the top-of-the-order-book and are likely to 
experience lower profitability as a result. This market speed condition has caused an 
imbalance between human traders and HFT’s providing HFTs with a big advantage over 
LFTs. For example, recent research into the imbalance between the outcomes of faster 
HFTs, mostly via algorithms and trading machines, and slower LFTs without machines 
shows that HFT traders exact rents from slower human traders [86] and [87] in that they 
are paid by exchanges, via the rebate system, for order flow.  
 
Much of the advantage of HFTs is their ability to adjust their trading strategy via their 
limit orders following the announcement of news that changes the basis for the trade. 
Biais et al [88] find that HFT have a greater opportunity to find profitable trades than their 
slower human counterparts. Another area of study that lends itself to comparative analysis 
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of HFTs and human traders is the way in which human traders show evidence of 
Anchoring, and how intently HFTs anchor their bids and asks to previous traded prices 
[89].  
 
This thesis poses several questions one of which is ‘can human LFTs improve their 
trading performance with the help of assistive and interventionist machines that augment 
their trading decisions and compete with HFTs?’ Evidence from the experimental studies 
conducted for this thesis suggest that human traders respond very well to collaboration 
with a supporting tool and that their behaviour changes positively with respect to the 
traditional biases seen in behavioural finance. One of the interesting observations we can 
make from the analysis of the experiment data is that traders appear to modify their order 
entry frequency more efficiently while trading with a BIT when opportunity presents 
itself as seen in the frequency of order entry and trades. The inclusion of smart tool trading 
linked to human cognition through realtime analysis of trading behaviour could 
potentially form the basis for a new style of market behaviour which is slower and more 
reasoned and which does not rely on ever faster transaction speeds that encourage the 
activity of HFTs.  Reducing the reliance of market participants on microsecond trading 
which only rewards those with faster execution speeds and preferential order types could 
be attractive to regulators as well as human traders, from an ethical standpoint. This thesis 
also takes the view that human traders are needed in the markets even though they are 
often viewed as lesser participants by other opportunistic and predatory higher frequency 
participants. As market microstructure studies have shown, markets are designed to 
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favour certain participants and the issue of market ethics and fairness becomes an 
important and challenging concept to determine and implement [90].  
 
5.1.2 Identifying trading frequency within time windows 
 
   5.1.2.1 The Human Trader 
 
The ideas related to combining human traders with assistive machines proposed in this 
thesis breaks new ground in several ways; firstly, in the way in which the human trader 
is analysed in realtime and in situ; secondly, with the design science supporting human-
machine interaction and collaboration through interventionist trading tools in realtime; 
thirdly, through the implications of this novel partnership between LFTs and assistive 
machines with regard to market micro-structure design and the potential abandonment of 
realtime transactional requirements; and fourthly, with regard to the creation of a more 
ethical marketplace that does not encourage HFT predominance or the consistent 
requirement for ‘winner takes all’ at the cutting edge of realtime.  
 
The thesis proposes new methods of examining and interpreting human trader critical 
point activity which significantly broaden the opportunities for research and introduces 
the previously unlikely opportunity of creating tools for these traders. In fact, human 
traders form a new subject group for decision sciences study now that realtime data can 
be analysed in situ. As [2] suggests, new approaches to research and assessment tools 
need to be created that are operational in the real marketplace so that results that are being 
generated are current, creating an accurate portrayal of realtime transaction and market 
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class statistics. In addition, such tools are useful in assessing the performance of assistive 
trading tools using automated order entry processes. As [91] pointed out in 2008, 
 
“Unfortunately, given the experience of market professionals who hoped to 
harness machine intelligence for their own enrichment, it may be a long time before 
robot traders can exhibit the ability to learn and adapt necessary for them to earn 
their keep in the marketplace”.  
 
The question is, ‘why try and replicate the human brain in trading when the human trader 
is very capable when linked to a responsive and interventionist machine?’ The human 
brain is still the most complex and able computer in existence and there is great benefit 
to augmenting it rather than replacing it. Miller [91] believes that  
 
“The real problem lies in the determining how much intelligence an agent requires 
to match human performance in a dynamic setting with constantly changing market 
conditions,”  
 
By trying to surpass the human trader by creating a robot to trade instead, researchers and 
market operators have been missing the point, with the more logical approach being to 
assist and augment the actions of the human trader with technology. Two things have 
prevented this to any great extent so far: first, the difficulty in studying the human trader 
in situ in the real markets and, secondly, then being able to create methods and practices 
that form the basis of technology that can truly augment the trader’s activities and reduce 
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the behavioural biases and heuristics. It should be repeated that currently the tools with 
which to augment human realtime decision-making in financial markets are in the early 
stages of production so the research experiments that were undertaken had to be 
constructed very carefully in order to give the impression that the LFTs were experiencing 
the intervention of fully-functional artificially intelligent tools. This lack of available 
technology can be easily understood when we consider what these tools would need to be 
able to do if they were active. Firstly, they would need to understand market conditions 
with the many thousands of informational inputs, then translate those conditions into 
expected actions, then analyse the trading activity of the human trader and identify if their 
behaviour is optimal given the market conditions, and then intervene in real time if the 
human trader’s actions did not look like they were going to optimize those market 
conditions, and then to decide how much leverage the actions should take. The BIT that 
forms the basis of this thesis is the first of its kind to be built to perform with these 
complexities and activities as a production tool.  
 
5.1.3 Are financial services trading ‘Smart’ tools really smart?  
 
The financial services industry that deals with trade execution services has taken hold of 
the term ‘smart’ to label a number of responsive services and functions in their software 
packages that do not belong in this category but are used more as a marketing ploy. 
‘Smart’ tools used by non-expert traders in the industry currently amount to a series of 
functions that repackage already available services and data in the form of Asset 
Relationship Pricing, Price aggregation services (that purport) to link prices, transaction 
services and self-learning algorithmic order routing processes, Execution services and 
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order management and wearables. The types of tools that this thesis proposes are closely 
related to autonomics and augmented reality in that they deal with complex environments, 
have an element of self-learning but they do not become self-managing in that they need 
the input of the trader in order to function and cannot enact tasks independently of the 
trader. They are responsive and augmenting and need a well-structured design and model. 
This thesis provides such a model. This opportunity is supported from the observations 
of the results of the experiments highlighted in Chapter 4, as we can see that human 
traders are willing to work with (what they believe) are highly intelligent machines and 
to allow them to intervene in their trading activity in order to exact improvements to 
trading behaviour. The experiments focused on human traders working together and 
working with machines for a shared beneficial outcome. We also see improvements to 
certain trading performance criteria including consecutive winners, negative drift 
thresholds and time in trade measures when human traders trade together or with 
machines as seen in RTDS in Figures 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17. In addition, in Table 5, The 
Experimental Results, the improvements in these measures is seen as being significant 
when a BIT is introduced. This provides a basis for creating models that rely on accurate 
realtime assessment of prices and time, sequence and repetition of profitable trading 
conditions with a view to supporting the trader with an Assistive tool that augments 
trading behaviour. Under the umbrella title of interventionist and assistive tools, smart 
interventionist and augmentation tools that propagate improvements to trader’s risky 
economical decision-making activities are a step into a new collaborative relationship 
between humans and machines in trading and may be the way forward for LFTs. This 
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Chapter makes the first move in supporting this relationship by suggesting a viable 
learning rule and decision rule approach to a model of operation for a BIT.   
 
 
5.2 Behavioural interventionist tools 
 
Soon it will be unthinkable for a human trader’s profitability to suffer because of simple 
loss-making errors that he or she has avoided before under the same or similar market 
conditions. Although the trader may not be able to recall the exact behavior they exercised 
in a previously experienced market condition which proved to be profitable or loss-
making, a new range of Assistive trading tools recognize the market scenarios, the trader’s 
realtime behavior in response to the market scenario and whether the trader is likely to 
trade profitably or not from his current actions. If not, then the tool intervenes and 
prevents errors from being made. By design, risk mitigation tools have been in use for 
many years in the form of automated stop losses, trailing stops, limit orders and others. 
Assistive and Interventionist trading tools may soon have the potential to intervene in a 
trader’s trading activity in a way that stop loss engines cannot, to limit mistakes and losses 
and to enhance successful behaviour. These tools have the potential to positively modify 
the trader’s experiences and activities over time through the consideration of the trader’s 
behaviour. They seek, among other things, to prolong good performance by extending 
profitable trades while reducing poor performance by limiting exposure to loss. It is likely 
that the successful outcome of certain critical point activities undertaken by human beings 
will increasingly rely on integration with advanced computer systems that augment 
human cognitive processes and abilities. Referred to as augmented cognition, [92] the 
objective is to integrate computer based systems that interweave with human cognitive 
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tasks so that the human response is elevated and enhanced. With regard to trading, 
performance analysis tools already capture data that enables us to evaluate the cognitive 
processes of human traders and Automated Trading Systems (ATS). These tools record, 
and enable us to make sense of, cognitive human responses to realtime data and 
information. For the human trader, deploying cognitive process-enhancing technology is 
still not a reality. In this thesis we look to form the foundations for current and future 
work to introduce a range of semi-cognitive augmentation tools that can assist the 
behavior of the electronic trader and automated trading system called Assistive trading 
tools.  
 
BITs, which are a newly proposed form of Assistive trading tool, can be designed to 
augment the decision-making activities of LFTs but not to control them. Unlike Direct 
Decision Devices (DDDs), prevalent in commerce and industry and involved in 
managerial and decision-making process that are either designed to completely displace 
the need for human intervention and to operate as autonomous entities or are used in 
conjunction with human activity but with the human as a subservient participant [93], 
BITs have ambivalence and collaboration as their goals enabling either LFT or BIT to 
intervene in actions instigated by the LFT depending on prevailing market conditions. 
While some research into DDDs forecasts the seismic shift in the balance of practical 
power from people to computer apparatus [93], this thesis points towards a different 
outcome. In the near future, a trader’s assistive tools may contribute to his decision-
making processes in much the same way as artificial cognitive systems might in the future 
influence a range of human critical point activities. For example, profit-making behavior 
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should be encouraged and loss-making behavior should be inhibited and different 
Assistive tools will be used for each of these purposes. If LFTs are to be successfully 
linked to semi-autonomous agents that offer assistive choices and use a method close to 
that of DDD’s how are these tools able to gain knowledge and understanding of the 
market place in order to augment the opportunity for successful trading activity? BITs 
enable the use of a number of processes to reduce poor decision-making. Whereas 
algorithmic tools or rules-based trading tools are based on investment criteria including 
risk and cost estimates, certain behavioral interventionist tools can select trading 
preferences based on the behavior of the LFT in current and past market scenarios. For 
example, a LFT who has never made a loss in a particular market scenario will be 
prevented from making a loss by the BIT if his behavior deviates when presented with 
that same market scenario. The BIT recognizes that the LFT does not normally make the 
type of trade he is making in this particular market scenario, or condition, and that such a 
trade is likely to be disadvantageous to the trader should the market continue in its current 
movement. The tool therefore inhibits the trader from placing more orders by restricting 
order placement of the same type and encourages him, be exhibiting a warning message, 
to trade out of the open position. This Assistive tool is called a Blocker and its sole purpose 
is to prevent a LFT from making uncharacteristically poor trades. The actions of the 
Blocker are described later in this chapter in section 5.2.2. How far should a BIT be trusted 
to intervene in the trading activity of a black box or a human trader? This question is open 
to debate and depends a great deal on the efficiency of such tools in being able to identify 
the characteristics of the open position or expected trade, the status of the marketplace 
and the behavior of the trader or automated trading system. Behavioral interventionist 
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tools provide a new generation of Assistive services for traders and automated trading 
systems. The opportunity is to be able to examine and understand the behavior of the LFT 
in realtime while looking for ways to positively modify their behavior and trading 
performance while the LFT is still trading. That is, to use learning reinforcement 
techniques linked to Assistive tools that identify profitable trading behavior and intervene 
while enabling the software to support the LFT in trading more successfully. In effect we 
create an intelligent collaborative system involving LFTs and BITs that understands its 
trading behavior in relation to the prevailing market conditions and the products it is 
trading. Realtime performance measurement tools are already being used to evaluate the 
performance of black box trading systems. Assistive tools can go one step further and 
positively modify LFT behavior in realtime. The practice works in the following way. 
With regard to black box systems, the performance measurement tools API is hooked up 
to the black box trading system and as the system is communicating with the market by 
sending orders or receiving fills, the data is sent via TCP/IP socket connections realtime 
to the central database server where parameters have been set to measure a range of 
performance levels. This then lays the basis for linking in methods for positively 
modifying the black box performance. Human trader Assistive tools, while in prototype 
form as described in this chapter have yet to be put into full production.  
 
5.2.1 Design Theory for BITS 
 
Loosely allied to that of DDDs and Decision Support Services (DSSs), the design theory 
for BITs is based on system causality [94]. LFTs are viewed as parts of a system which 
includes the interface from the trading engine, the BIT and elements of price data, trading 
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volume and others. Each part acts and reacts to different conditions in different ways. 
Causality enables the BIT to observe which activities are caused by one component of the 
system and which by another, thus being able to establish an observation of which events 
are likely to happen, which events will happen as a result of the previous event, and which 
events will not happen. Then the BIT can exclude certain responses that represent “causal 
loops” [94] which are operationally impossible. For example, if the LFT and the BIT were 
about to support trades in opposite directions, one buying and one selling simultaneously, 
which would net out the position while incurring the cost of the dealing spread once 
traded. Researchers can refer to these as automata-constructs [13]. The BIT requires a 
multifunction ambivalence which continuously questions ‘who leads who?’ in the actions 
of the system components. There are examples in commercial use today with airline 
manufacturers like Boeing and Airbus providing DDDs that directly intervene and shut-
off the pilot’s involvement in flying the plane if there is an imminent collision with a 
building for example [95]. The DDDs will take over and make the behavioural adjustment 
in isolation. Although outside of the scope of this thesis, there is also opportunity for 
linking together modules for data analysis, modelling, and prediction at runtime to 
support agent decision-making adding behavioural components in the Common 
Language Runtime (CLR) for BITs. 
 
5.2.2 The market conditions 
 
If you are not a HFT with access to privileged order types, successful trading is a direct 
result of the interpretation of market conditions. This is an inexact science and has 
fostered the burgeoning growth of the technical and fundamental analysis industries in 
financial markets as a result. No one has prior knowledge of market movements unless 
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they are competing illegally or have a queue-jumping order book advantage like HFTs. 
The BIT is not trying to make sense of market conditions, that are probably unlimited in 
their scope, but instead, is making sense of the LFTs reaction to market conditions. An 












Figure 19 Trading Frame Identities and Actions 
Figure 19 shows the way in which the BIT identifies Frames Identities that are caused by certain 
actions by the trader in different market conditions.    
In Figure 19 the LFT has made a series of trading actions which have been split into four 
frames. The frames are distinct because they record different actions in different 
conditions with different outcomes. A database of such frames is built up from historical 
data and forms a repository that the BIT can access. The four frames in Figure 19 focus 
on different trading activities and outcomes which are referred to as ‘Frame Identities’. 
This means that different frames can be grouped together over time if they show similar 
identities making the selection of BIT responses to those frames much easier than having 
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to recalibrate the BITS understanding of them each time they appear. In Frame 1 For 
example, the trader begins with a flurry of trades that initially leads to a small loss but 
then translates into a reasonable profit of 400 by the end of the frame. The Identity of this 
frame is that it is a Loss to Profit Frame with an initial series of short-burst trades that add 
to Consecutive winners. The Time between Trades is lengthy while the profit is increasing 
which denotes that the trader is holding a winning position that becomes more profitable 
over time. At the end of the frame there is a short burst of trading activity which, again, 
is profitable and which leads to an additional open position that is a Consecutive Winner 
to the previous trade. By establishing that Frame 1 has resulted in a profit with its 
associated trade activities, the BIT then adds this to its repository of frames. The BIT is 
focused on the trader’s actions while constantly referring to the market conditions and its 
database of frames. The actions that make the BIT begin a new frame are those which 
show a marked difference from previous actions. In Figure 19 Frame 2 sees the rapid 
entry of several short time-interval trades which lead to further profit then followed by a 
a significant period of calm where, again, the trader holds a long winning position which 
goes further into profit.  Frame 3 sees a series of lengthy Time between Trades that, 
eventually coincide with a drop in profitability. There is then a gap of around an hour 
where the trader has no position but then in Frame 4, he shows some rapid trading activity 






With an understanding of the various Frame Identities associated with the trader’s activity 
the BIT can then begin to intervene in the trader’s activity in a supporting and 
augmentative role.  An example of the frame identity that would cause the BIT to 












Figure 20 Frame Identities showing Loss-Making Behaviour 
Figure 20 shows three Frame Identities which are associated with losing trades, a clear basis for 
NIT to deploy and interventionist blocking tool to prevent the trader from making additional 
losing trades in the same market condition.  
 
In Figure 20 we see a very different outcome to the trader’s activity compared with Figure 
19. Frame 1 shows a number of trades with varying lengths of time between them which 
are, on the whole, loss-making. This type of trading behaviour is often associated with a 
form of activity called averaging where a trader adds to losing trades by instigating 
additional long losing trades as market prices fall. This has the effect of compounding 
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losses. It can be seen from Frame 1 that the trader is holding onto a losing position as 
there is hardly any trading activity while the profit deteriorates. In Frame 2 the trader 
consistently loses with new open long positions compounding losses quickly. He then, 
does nothing for two hours and then, in Frame 3, ends the trading day with a flurry of 
trades that don’t prove to be profitable. What would be the optimal action from the BIT 
to overcome these clear failures in trading activity? In this example, the BIT would have 
identified in Frame 1 that the trader was overtrading and losing gradually. It would have 
compared the frequency of new orders and subsequent new trades generated by the trader 
with the Winner/Loser ratio to determine how successful these trades were. It would also 
have logged the Consecutive Losing Trade rate which would have led it to reduce the 
order size of the trader’s activity as his actions and outcomes became more erratic. In 
Frame 2 the BIT would have intervened by using a Blocker to prevent the trader adding 
new long trades and from making further losses. From the early results of the Prototype 
BIT we can see that this blocking action works.    
 
5.2.3 The BIT Prototype 
 
The prototype BIT was developed as an extension to the RTDS, using a historical 
database of the trader’s trading activity as a basis for qualifying the current trading data 
captured by RTDS. The thresholds for activating BIT intervention were colour-coded so 
that, while the back-end of the programme was being built, it would be possible to see 
when the BIT would have acted from the colour changes in the respective fields. In Figure 
21, for example, there are multiple observations of the trader’s activity over a trading 
session that show a graded colour-coded response from bright green to dark red. The 
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boxes with green cells are positive and the boxes with red cells are negative. The BIT 
would have responded to any of the data that caused the box to go red. There are several 
tabs in the software that identify certain classes of data including the main categories of 
metrics identified in the Introduction on page 16, so that the user can tab between the 
different sets of metrics. Market conditions are broken down into four subsets: Sideways, 
Breakout, Trending and Reversal. While many more iterations to these basic market 
conditions will be added, these four base conditions are useful in identifying which trades 
were undertaken during which conditions so that a better understanding of the trader’s 











Figure 21 BIT Graphical User Interface (Prototype) 
Figure 21 shows the early prototype of the BIT with two sections. The first section shows the   
range of market conditions and the second section a range of base metrics. The colour-coded 
boxes denote of an action has resulted in a positive or negative result, green being positive and 




In order to assess the performance of the trader, the BIT observes that during condition 
‘Trending’ the LFT normally trades in a profitable way and therefore the BIT expects a 
certain type of positive behaviour to result. If the LFT does not follow the normal 
approach, which in most cases has led to a profitable trading opportunity, the BIT 
intervenes to modify and enhance the LFTs trading actions. As the LFT is likely to be 
trading in short time intervals the universe of possible outcomes is low and repetitive, 
making the function of arriving at an optimal decision more likely. The most logical 
approach to encompassing market conditions and recognizing patterns and repetitive 
movements is to chunk up the price activity into frames of reference which are not time 
dependent but activity dependent as seen in Figures 19 and 20, so instead of trying to read 
the flow of the market conditions, the BIT has a database of a multitude of market 
condition frames that it can select if the current market conditions are the same or similar 
to that seen before. The BIT is not expected to provide a perfect reading of market 
conditions in order to facilitate the ever improving profitability of LFTs. It is designed to 
augment the LFTs decision-making processes by providing support and intervening when 
necessary rather than when it can. In this way, the LFT has not found a magic genie in 
the form of a BIT that will make them extraordinarily profitable but a tool that augments 
their decisions and prevents them from making unnecessary mistakes. With this in mind, 
the core operating model must be designed in a causal manner.  
 
During the early prototype developmental process, the BIT was used to monitor the 
trader’s reaction to the two market conditions that lead to the trader’s behaviour in Figure 




1. A period of price momentum (Figure 19) 
2. A sudden directional change to prices (Figure 20) 
The results from the use of the prototype were encouraging. In one key improvement, the 
deviation from historically successful trading behaviour was reduced by the activities of 
the prototype BIT. For example, the BIT identified occasions in the trader’s historical 
trading data when market Sideways and Trending conditions were evident, mapped the 
trader’s historical responses to these conditions and graded the optimality of his current 
trading activities in the current market conditions. The relevant boxes changed colour, 
from green to red or red to green, signifying that the BIT would have acted at certain 
points during the trading activities.  
 
1. A Period of Price Momentum 
Market price momentum in a Trending condition, was identified by the BIT on several 
occasions in Figure 19 and were mapped as periods of up to seven minutes when prices 
increased on average by 0.15%-0.35% above the initial trigger price, the price that caused 
the trader to open the trading position. Trader’s reactions to periods of price momentum 
were to generally hold an open position without adding to it. The optimal trading response 
would be to add to winning positions and not to close the open position. The BIT would 
promote the opportunity to add to winning positions. The BIT also identified occasions 
when the trader closed a profitable trade before the price momentum move had concluded, 
thus registering a high Positive Drift score. This was not an optimal trade and reflected 




2. A Sudden Directional Change to Prices 
 
Sudden directional price change, like that which happened in Figure 20, can cause the 
trader to keep losing positions open in the hope that the negative price movement will be 
short lived and will quickly return to the mean average price. This is a good example of 
where the BIT would prove useful by preventing traders from holding losing positions 
over such periods or by blocking their attempts to open new losing trades in the opposite 
direction to the price movement (known as ‘averaging’ in the industry). The BIT function 
is to block attempts to open new trades that might potentially lose if the price continues 
to move negatively against already established open losing position. This function proved 
to work well in the prototype and blocked the trader from making this type of loss-making 
behaviour.   
 
5.2.3 BIT core operating model  
 
Unlike algorithmic trading, a human trader model is not based on price evaluation but on 
behaviour evaluation so that the market environment is a component of the design 
structure not the starting point. The model recognizes good performance through the 
metrics (see Appendix 1) that it uses to grade a multitude of framed market conditions. 
When the model recognizes good performance it then equates the actions that caused the 
good performance to the prevailing market conditions which causes a feedback loop. The 
BIT is not designed to think for the trader but to provide a degree of assistive reasoning 
in order to support the functional use of trading software as an Assistive trading tool. 
Before long, traits and patterns begin to appear in the behavioral statistics of traders given 
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similar market scenarios and the more a trader practices in simulated markets to perfect a 
response to these market conditions using his good behavioral traits, the greater his 
chances of success should a similar market scenario present itself. When the LFT is 
certain that he has encompassed the necessary responses to a particular market scenario 
that, over time, is likely to repeat itself, he can do one of two things; build himself an 
automated black box to trade automatically when the scenario presents itself without 
flexibility or employ the services of a BIT with a behavioral profile helps him to deploy 
his trading skills in the correct way.  
 
5.2.4 Using a Bayesian causal model 
 
The reason for selecting a Bayesian causal model rather than a statistical probability 
model is that there is a difference between causality and statistical analysis. Statistical 
analysis deals with the interpretation of uncertainty under static conditions while causal 
analysis deals with changing conditions [100]. Traded markets are in a state of constant 
change and the trader must make some sense of them in order to trade effectively and 
profitably. However, these changing conditions occur within a set of parameters in that 
there are a finite number of market conditions that can occur. As explained in 5.2.3, 
markets have four basic conditions but a large range of subsets of those conditions. 
With a defined range of scenarios, trading is then an excellent environment to use a 
Bayesian Causal Model as the universe of probable outcomes is restricted making the 
BIT’s job easier. The first objective in introducing a Bayesian causal model is to 




5.2.4.1 Learning and Decision rules 
 
In the model, the BIT has a prior based on the probability of an outcome in the shape of 
a frame. The BIT forms an estimated value of a possible outcome according to the prior 
condition and the available data resources it interacts with in intermediate and historical 
memory. As seen in Figure 22, each time there is a price change, or market event that 
causes a new condition, this probability is updated. The prior condition added to the new 
condition creates a new outcome. The BIT establishes an estimated value of a future 











 Figure 22 Bayesian prior and expected probability distribution 
 
With an evolving set of observed outcomes, the BIT is able to select from this database 
to compare the current market conditions and actions of the trader with historical results. 
The larger the database the more scenarios the BIT has to work with and the more focused 
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the observation of probable success (or not) of new scenarios. By applying a weighting 
of higher value to outcomes that prove to be more profitable, the BIT then ranks new 
scenario outcomes in order of the quality of return or the least loss. As more trading data 
and related price activity are generated by the LFT, the BIT reassesses the potential of 
likely outcomes and modifies the approach according to Bayes theorem. As the number 
of potential outcomes become more focused, each old outcome is conditionalised with 
the new outcome drawn from incoming data. New data that is inconsistent with optimum 
results is discarded, and the BIT then arrives on a learning rule and, potentially, a decision 
rule based on maximum utility. The BIT then utilizes its learning rule and decision rule 
to intervene positively in the LFT’s trading activity if it falls inside the optimal trading 
scenario or prevents the trader executing a particular action if it falls outside of the 
decision rule maximum utility.  
 
The process whereby BITs take in new data and readjust their actions via a feedback loop 
with the comparison to prior states is a dynamic one. This has inherent flexibility for the 
BIT to adjust prior assumptions in the light of new conditions and observations in 
realtime. Much in the same way that human brains adjust their outlook and actions based 
on ever-changing conditions, the BIT adds a new dimension to LFT decision-making 








5.2.5 BIT momentum trading model 
 
If we take a common trading procedure called pyramiding, that is adding to winning 
positions, this is one of the problems that LFTs have and is identified as an outcome of 
the Disposition Effect. If a LFT makes a profit, as described in Chapter 4, they are more 
likely to close the position with an element of profit still remaining in the subsequent 
price movement of the instrument. This was referred to as ‘Positive Drift’ in that the trader 
forsakes a degree of profitability by closing out the position too early. An assistive trading 
tool could work to prolong and enhance the LFT’s profitability by holding the trade for 
longer in the following way:   
 
1. The BIT recognises that the market is in a trend by registering the range of 
higher highs and higher lows in the market as a particular frame. 
2. Through the frame components, the BIT knows that the price at 2040 has 
been moving steadily upward from 2032 and has maintained this upward 
momentum for a number of minutes 
3. There are no changes in the prevailing market condition or activity in that 
the price momentum continues to build 
4. There are no timetabled events in the way of news, statistical 
announcements or corporate events scheduled to interrupt this momentum 
5. Market characteristics like trade volume, market participation levels, time 
of day, other markets in similar domains and other instruments in similar 
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domains are all pointing towards the continuation of this momentum pattern 
with no interruption 
6. The trader however, decides to close the position ahead of time at 2043, 
disregarding the benign conditions of the market 
7. When the trader makes the action to close the position, the BIT prevents 
this from happening, sending a comment on the GUI to the trader that “all 
is well: keep with the trade”  
8. Taking some precaution, the machine adds a trailing stop to the position 6 
ticks away at 2037 from the current price and then narrows this range of this 
stop as the momentum takes the price 10 ticks higher to 2053.  
9. Market conditions change and suggest the instrument is overbought and the 
machine then brings the trailing stop to within 2 ticks of the prevailing price 
to 2051 
10. The price continues to move up a further 4 ticks to 2055 and then drops to 
2053 where the stop is activated and the trader closes the position 
11. By intervening to continue the open position, the machine has enabled the 
trade to gain a further 10 ticks.  
 
5.2.6 BIT breakout trading model 
 
In another example, if a futures trader has a short open position in five contracts in the 
CME E-Mini S&P 500 futures™ traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and is 
worried about the slowly upward trending market suffering from a sudden breakout 
scenario on the upside, he can cover his position risk by making use of stops to stop 
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himself out at three ticks above the current level for a limited loss. However, when he is 
out of the market he is likely to miss opportunities for selling short when the upward 
market move loses momentum. Traditionally he has always sold into a breakout or a rally 
far too early and has ended up losing heavily covering his loss making short positions, 
while being too afraid to sell short at the apex of the upward move even though he 
recognizes it almost 90% of the time. By practicing the behavior required to take 
advantage of this particular market scenario on a simulated market, he is now in a position 
to control his behavior and to wait until the right selling cue presents itself in such a 
market scenario. He is however, afraid that he might sell too early so he uses a BIT with 
a Blocker tool and a Refiner tool. The BIT blocker tool stops him from selling too early 
and the BIT Refiner tool inhibits him from taking too large a position in the initial short 
move by reducing the number of contracts the LFT wishes to trade. This may seem a 
simple example, but LFTs who have a bias for selling short tend to have two main failings: 
selling short too early in a breakout or a rally and selling too many contracts at what they 
believe is the apex of the upward move. This is a simple example of the uses of two tools 
currently under development.  
 
 
5.2.7 Data assistive BITs 
 
The objective of using any BIT is to enhance the probability of profitability while 
reducing the likelihood of loss. What is unique to these tools is the way in which they 
interact with order flow and market price data. The degree of interaction varies according 
to the level to which the trader wants to be assisted. Some LFTs prefer to be at liberty to 
make as many mistakes as they wish while others may prefer to have the surety that a BIT 
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blocker tool will inhibit them from selling into a rising market if the market scenario starts 
to turn suddenly from negative to positive. The range of data Assistive trading tools that 
could be developed include those BITs that aggregate useful data in the way of news 
information and research that support the selection of market condition frames when the 
trading conditions of the LFT are in line. In addition, a BIT could provide a realtime 
strategy compilation and could select and vary information it provides to the LFT 
according to what product he is trading and where it is in the trade cycle. For example, if 
the trader has taken an open position in a particular asset or derivative, the BIT will create 
useful and potentially profitable strategy profiles by simulating the combination of the 
open position with a group of related other products. In this way, if a trader takes a 
position in a CBOT US 30-year Treasury Bond future, the BIT will present a profile of 
the same position combined with a CBOT US 10-Year Treasury note future, a volatility 
trade including treasury options and the cash underlying. If the trader likes what he sees, 
he can select a particular strategy and trade it instantaneously. The difference between 
having an on-screen template of all the possible combinations of US Treasury derivative 
and cash products is that the BIT only selects those strategies that fit the trading profile 
of the trader and switches between possible strategies realtime as soon as particular 
variables change like price, traded volume, time before expiration, economic 
announcements and the level of interest rates.   
 
5.2.8 Data aggregation BITs 
 
A data Aggregator tool aggregates performance data sets that correspond with the best 
and worst trades an LFT executed during a trading session. By doing this, the LFT is then 
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able to see clearly what happened during the particular trading scenario. Traditionally 
data aggregation tools provided by financial markets data vendors sort and arrange market 
information, product prices, financial news and other information that has been selected 
by the LFT in prefigured screen templates and then present the data to the trader in easily 
recognizable forms. The difference between this type of data processing service and BIT 
technology is that the latter will vary the information it selects for the LFT according to 
his trading circumstances. For example, the objective of the data Assistive BITs is to 
concentrate on performance metrics, behavioral data and strategy compilation. The data 
Aggregator BITs unscramble the volume of performance data being presented to the 
trader so that it is sorted, collated and delivered quickly and efficiently whilst the data 
that isn’t important is disgarded. For example, if the trader is successfully pyramiding his 
open positions, the Assistive BITs will highlight other metrics that work in conjunction 
with pyramiding like performance taper (trading performance is diminishing) and 
momentum (the trading position is becoming progressively profitable) and the alpha trade 
(an optimum trading scenario). In another example, the data Assistive tool may recognize 
the onset of an alpha trade and bring it to the LFTs attention. The point behind the use of 
these tools is that their deployment is directly  linked to the behaviour of the LFT, be it 
successful or not. By interfacing with performance metrics, BITs actively seek to 
influence a LFT’s behaviour either directly, in the case of a blocker BIT or indirectly in 
the case of data Assistive processes. There are undoubtedly times when Assistive tools 
should be used in moderation, in particular when the trader has a firm conviction about a 
market move that he has not experienced before. There are mechanisms that can be 
incorporated into the model that the LFT can use to control the sensitivity of the BITs. 
143 
 
However, experience sometimes shows that a high percentage of trader losses occur when 
the trader is bored and paying little attention to what he is doing, implied volatility is low, 
or trading volume is particularly low. During these periods, if the LFT does not have the 
discipline to stay out of the market until a more favorable scenario presents itself, then 




We are just beginning to comprehend the vast array of automated tools and process that 
can be used to augment reatime trading behavior and time will tell which tools become 
prevalent. One thing is for sure, however, and that is that the industry market 
microstructure may not remain in its current form for too much longer. The centralized 
electronic exchange infrastructure of contract markets with their enclosed limited 
membership and central limit order books have to give way to more distributed models at 
some point in the near future and when that happens, the trading ‘wild west’ will be upon 
us. When we get there we are likely to see multiple asset class assembly by complex data 
sifters and combinatorial tools, esoteric arbitrage opportunities between dissimilar 
products, deep website database mining by sophisticated electronic ‘eyes’ and dynamic 































Conclusion and Contributions  
 
This Chapter concludes the thesis by providing a summary of the main areas of the research, 
highlighting the aims and objectives and areas of interest with regard to further study. The results 





The objective of the research is to determine whether there is a basis for linking human 
traders with a range of newly created Assistive trading tools in order to improve 
performance by removing or controlling several previously documented biases and 
behaviours (Loss Aversion, Disposition Effect, and Over-confidence in predictions) 
associated with unprofitable trading. The objective is to form the basis for creating a 
range of Assistive trading tools that intervene positively in the decision-making 
processes of the LFT enhancing profitable behavior and actions and reducing the impact 
of loss making behavior. The opportunities and challenges are as follows:  
 How to evaluate LFTs in realtime 
 How to create Assistive tools and algorithms that support the LFT 
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 How to measure the success or failure of the LFT’s activities in 
relation to these tools 
 How to use the findings to reinforce productive trading behaviour 
and how to reduce loss-making behaviour 
The thesis takes three traditional methods of measuring and assessing human trader 
activity (Loss Aversion, Disposition effect, Overconfidence) and applies a new 
collaborative and machine approach to them to see if there are differences in LFT trading 
behaviour. By doing this the thesis extends and enhance the current research into trading 
decision-making and behavioural biases into new areas of study,   
 
6.1.1 What problems and challenges exist? 
  
1. Gathering extensive microscopic trading and market data, that isn’t readily 
available at a professional trader level, in order to create the basis for 
examination and ultimately the formulation of new concepts and methods 
for creating the link between traders and Assistive trading tools 
2. Utilizing this realtime data in order to formulate measurement methods and 
concepts to evaluate trader performance historically and in realtime 
3. Interpreting data into meaningful trading actions that are influenced by 
Assistive trading tools 
4. Creating the basis for realtime ongoing risk management surveillance of 
trading activity either directly from the Assistive trading tools or linked to a 
trader response  
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The thesis describes methods for capturing realtime data and analysing it and then the 
tools that could be created to assist the trader. In addition, the thesis suggests that the 
experiment results and findings could potentially influence future market microstructure 
design, perhaps removing the predominance of HFTs and introducing a more capable 
LFT supported by BITs. These findings pose a number of important questions, however:  
1. Do humans trust machines enough to let them intervene in risky decisions 
regarding money? 
2. How does working in a group or working with machines in risky decision-making 
situation change trading behaviour?  
3. How does this change the way we look at markets and their purpose?  
4. How does this influence our view of market ethics? 
5. How does this influence market micro structure? 
6. Does this bring back the human trader into the markets to compete more 




In the end, human traders will need to decide if they trust machines to make risky decisions on 
their behalf, or at least to nudge them in the right direction. Will the results show that human 
traders are happy to trust machines to enact direct decision-making behaviour? Perhaps this may 
be the case when there are small sums at stake and there is autonomous control over the ensuing 
outcome. If the machine makes a mistake, the human trader can intervene in the result of that 
mistake. The difficulty arises when the human trader has the option to rely on the machine in a 
relationship that is far from non-interventionist. There will be a need for an asymmetrical dual-
dependence approach where both agents have lead-response initiative but only one can overrule 
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the other at any time; the human can overrule the machine. Also there is a need for a continuously 
coordinated abstraction assessment of the trading environment (the CLOB) before decisions can 
be made so that trading decisions reflect the correct conditions of the time. This realtime 
assessment needs to be indisputable by both parties and thus must follow a structured format. The 
asymmetrical dual-dependency of human and machine, whereby the human trader has ultimate 
control in an outwardly autonomous relationship, enables intervention to take place in many 
instances including modifying orders once they have been placed (post-order variation) and 
reacting to the semantic content of information and news. The study of LFTs performing 
realtime in their ecological environment forms a new aspect of study that extends previous 
knowledge of behavioural decision-making theory into the realtime activity of expert 
financial operators.  In the current study, trader’s behavioural data is recorded and directly 
mapped to the price behavior of the futures instrument they are trading with millisecond 
accuracy. Research then prompts other questions to be asked including ‘can the results of 
realtime trader activity in situ be compared effectively to trading in a simulated 
environment?’ Of further interest is the research area of market microstructure. 
Interesting and useful observations have been made with regard to market microstructure 
with evidence that that bid–ask spreads and trading volume have a negative effect on 
transaction duration [72]. This suggests that wider bid-ask spreads and lower trading 
volume adversely impact on transaction duration while narrower bid-ask spreads and 
higher transaction volume impact positively. Additionally, evidence suggests that trades 
tend to form clusters over time and although this can form randomly, the intensity of the 
clusters forms particular interest. Another interesting order-related analysis involves the 
possibility of a ‘‘house money’’ effect and/or a ‘‘break even’’ effect [166] which assert 
that decision makers’ risk taking is affected by past gains and losses. The ‘‘house money’’ 
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effect asserts that risk taking is facilitated by previous gains. How these different aspects 
of market microstructure influence the behaviour of BITs will form an interesting future 
study. Further discussion and research could also focus on the way in which LFTs are 
susceptible to success and failure clouding at extremes of loss or profitability. For the 
industry, this research may form the basis of a new risk management tool based on the 
changing attitude of the trader to losses. What the exchange provides is not an uncertain 
risk, an equal bet. It provides clues as to how to reduce these risks and to benefit the 
trader. Through the research the following result can be clearly seen: LFTs who have 
higher risk tolerances and thresholds, are more likely to treat losses and profits in an equal 
way, as a cost of doing business, rather than risking losses and not profits. It is a central 
view that LFTs demonstrate, through time intervals between placing their trades, an 




O’Hara [2] fired a broadside across the boughs of the financial markets stating that market 
microstructure conditions had changed for the worse and asking for a new way to research 
markets and their participants. This thesis proposes a range of suggested new methods 
and tools for helping human traders to compete in a high-frequency trading environment 
in answer to this challenge. Under the current conditions, human traders have difficulty 
trading against predatory algorithms and the thesis proposes methods that support the 
creation of Assistive tools that can help them to compete profitably. It also develops 
further understanding of classical decision-making theory in a realtime trading context 
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demonstrating that human traders improve decision-making biases when linked together 
in groups or with an assistive machine. 
 
As described in the thesis human traders are monitored, and their data is captured, in 
realtime and in situ using unique tools designed for the purpose. The trading performance 
and behavioural characteristics of the traders are studied in this context in order to 
determine if they can be positively modified. The thesis presents a new model for studying 
human trading behaviour in realtime and in situ using the unique RTDS software. It also 
describes the basis for the development of a range of Interventionist and Assistive tools 
that are designed to augment trading performance. The approach put forward is unique in 
its application. It also provides evidence that human traders are willing to allow machines 
to augment their trading decisions.  
 
Other contributions of this thesis are that it overcomes the problem of assessing human 
trader risk-taking behaviour in realtime and in situ, it makes sense of human trading 
behaviour at realtime speeds and then it shows that, with new approaches to human-
machine collaboration, trading performance improves and traditional classic decision-
making biases are reduced.   
  Lastly, this thesis provides the basis through new models, methods, tools and approaches 
for a re-think leading of the effectiveness, and, to some degree, the fairness of the 
following areas by developing methods for realtime work using tools to observe, 
positively modify and intervene in market trading activity:  
1. Risky Decision-making 
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2. Psychology and behavioural finance 
3. Market Microstructure 
4. Ethics in Financial markets  
5. Booms and bust cycles 
6. Trading technology 
7. Research 
8. Financial Education: Learning through trading 
 
    6.4 Future opportunities 
 
This thesis describes and promotes a new level of human trader understanding through 
the access to rich realtime data sets, in context and in situ. Although part of the future 
reach of the research in this thesis, the findings significantly broaden the scope to create 
new study methods and models for behavioural analysis at realtime speeds and brings into 
play some new ideas with regard to improving financial markets design including market 
microstructure, HFT and market regulation. In future following the findings detailed in 
this thesis, there is merit in the possible modification to financial market transaction 
architectures, in particular, the industry reliance on realtime transactions and micro-
second trading speeds. This may extend the reach of the research into GUI design and 







6.4.1 Extending classical theory of risky decision-taking 
 
This thesis describes how these innovations extend the classical view of some of the elements of 
risky decision making and seeks to extend the three cornerstones of economic risky decision-
making namely Loss aversion, Disposition effect and Overconfidence in predictions by assessing 
them in relation to BITs and to observing changes to the ways in which human traders use them.  
The thesis describes experiments that extend classical theory into the realtime context.    
6.5 New areas of research  
 
The thesis opens up new suggestions on areas of study, concepts and methods for the 
implementation of these activity links between human traders and machines by looking 
at the traditional measures of trader realtime-decision making psychology and applying 
them to a structured collaborative environment with other traders and machines. By using 
a range of metrics to interpret trader behaviour in situ and in realtime, this thesis breaks 
new ground in analyzing and researching trader behaviour. This thesis also suggests that 
LFTs use of Assistive trading tools in the form of BITs that encourage 
profitable/reasonable/ethical trading behavior begin to remove damaging behavioural 
inconsistencies and biases by improving trading behaviour and reducing market risk. 
These tools reduce the impact of inefficient traders and reduce the opportunity for herd 
instinct and ultimately, longer term booms and busts. Once methods and processes have 
been designed to take these observations and analysis to a higher level, traders in situ and 
in realtime can work directly with tools that can be created that intervene in a positive 
way in the critical point activity of the traders. The results have far reaching implications 
for studying and interpreting human-machine interaction and extend the field of study in 
this area. For example, it was observed that human traders were comfortable working 
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collaboratively with each other and with machines in a high-risk environment. This is not 
common practice presently as most LFTs trade independently of each other even though 
their risk is assessed by risk managers as a group in most cases. Markets should seek to 
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7.1 Metrics used in Calculations in RTDS  
 
1. Winner Count 
 
2. Loser Count 
 
3. Scratch Count 
 
4. Long Winners 
  
5. Long Losers 
 
6. Long Scratches 
 
7. Short Winners 
 
8. Short Losers 
  
9. Short Scratches 
  
10. P/L per Contract Traded 
 
11. Average P/L per Winning Contract Traded   
  
12. Average P/L per Losing Contract Traded 
 
13. Average Time in Trade 
 
14. Average Time in Winner 
 
15. Average Time in Loser 
 
16. Average Time in Scratch 
 
17. Average Time Since Last Trade Winner 
 




19. Average Time Since Last Trade Scratch 
 
20. Average Time Since Last Trade 
 
21. Max Loser 
 
22. Max Winner 
 
23. Average Winner PL 
 
24. Average Loser PL 
 
25. Average Trade PL 
 
26. Standard Deviation of Times in Trade 
 
27. Standard Deviation of Times in Winners 
 
28. Standard Deviation of Times in Losers 
 
29. Standard Deviation of Times in Scratches 
 
30. Standard Deviation of Times Since Last Trade 
 
31. Standard Deviation of Times Since Last Trade Winner 
 
32. Standard Deviation of Times Since Last Trade Loser 
 
33. Standard Deviation of Times Since Last Trade Scratches 
 
34. Average Time in Trade (W) 
 
35. Average Time in Trade (L) 
 
36. Average Time Since Last Trade (W) 
 
37. Average Time Since Last Trade (L) 
  
38. Average PL (W) 
 
39. Average PL (L) 
 
40. Range P/L per Trade (W) 
 




42. Max Trade P/L (W) 
 
43. Max Trade P/L (L) 
 
44. Use of Time in All Trades 
 
45. Average Trade Theta (W) 
  
46. Average Trade Theta (L)  
 
47. Total Time in Trade (W) 
 
48. Total Time in Trade (L) 
 
49. Average P/L per Contract Traded 
 
50. Average P/L per Spread Traded 
 
51. Spread Traded Range (W) 
 
52. Spread Traded Range (L) 
 
53. Use of Time in Winners 
 
54. Use of Time in Losers 
  
55. Consistency in Winners 
 
56. Consistency in Losers 
 
57. Erratic Behavior in Winners 
 
58. Erratic Behavior in Losers 
 
59. Clouding in Winners 
 
60. Clouding in Losers 
 
61. Pyramiding in Winners 
 








65. Total Trade PL (W/L) 
 
66. Average Trade Size 
 
67. Average Winner Size 
 
68. Average Loser Size 
 
69. Average Scratch Size 
 
70. Average Number of Trades (W) 
 
71. Average Number of Trades (L) 
 
72. Pattern Recognition Score 
 
73. Performance Taper (W) 
 
74. Performance Taper (L) 
 
75. Average Positive Drift 
 
76. Average Negative Drift 
 
77. Maximum Positive Drift 
 
78. Maximum Negative Drift 
 
79. Average Drift Ratio 
 
80. Max Drift Ratio 
 
81. Average Drift (W/L) 
 
82. Average Missed Positive Drift 
 
83. Average Missed Negative Drift 
 
84. Missed Opportunity (W) 
 
85. Missed Opportunity (L) 
 
86. Loss to Profit Momentum 
 




88. Market Class Recognition 
 
89. Number of Trades in Sideways 
 
90. Number of Trades in Breakout 
 
91. Number of Trades in Trending 
 
92. Number of Trades in Reversal 
 
93. Number of Winners in Sideways 
 
94. Number of Winners in Breakout 
 
95. Number of Winners in Trending 
 
96. Number of Winners in Reversal 
 
97. Number of Losers in Sideways 
 
98. Number of Losers in Breakout 
 
99. Number of Losers in Trending 
 
100. Number of Losers in Reversal 
 
101. Profit Restoration  
 
102. Repeat Trade(W) 
 
103. Repeat Trade (L) 
 
104. P/L in Sideways 
 
105. P/L in Breakout 
 
106. P/L in Trending 
 
107. P/L in Reversal 
 
108. Avg P/L in Sideways 
 
109. Avg P/L in Breakout 
 




111. Average P/L in Reversal 
 
112. Sideways Score 
 
113. Breakout Score 
 
114. Trending Score 
 
115. Reversal Score 
 
116. Time in Trade Range Score (W) 
 
117. Time in Trade Range Score (L) 
 
118. Risk Return Score (W) 
 
119. Risk Return Score (L) 
 
120. Trade Class Score (W) 
 
121. Trade Class Score (L) 
 
122.  Trade Class Score (Sideways) 
 
123. Trade Class Score (Trending) 
 
124. Trade Class Score (Reversal) 
 
125. Trade Class Score (Breakout) 
 
126. Trade Trigger Reaction Time (W) 
 
127. Trade Trigger Reaction Time (L) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
